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INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance is a means, not an end. Before we can
speak intelligently about corporate governance, we must define its
goals. In much of the recent academic literature on corporate gov-
ernance, however, the goals are either ill-defined or assumed with-
out examination. Academic writers commonly assume that a corpo-
rate governance system should be designed primarily to ensure
that the actions of a corporation's managers and directors accu-
rately reflect the wishes of its stockholders.' This assumption rests
in turn on the premise that stockholders, as owners of the corpora-
tion, have the intrinsic right to dictate the corporation's course and
receive its profits. Once this premise is accepted, the recognition of
the separation of ownership and management as the central char-
acteristic of the modern public corporation2 leads inexorably to the
conclusion that the central goal of corporate governance is to disci-
pline managers, that is, make managers conform their actions to
the desires of stockholders.
This line of academic analysis has coincided with the rise of
hostile takeovers. Ignoring the quite varied sources and motiva-
tions of hostile acquirors, academic writers have embraced the hos-
tile takeover as the free-market device to rid corporations of bad
managers and give stockholders their entitled profit in the pro-
t Members of the Firm of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, New York. The authors'
colleague, Yvonne M. Dutton, assisted in the preparation of this Article.
I See, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a
Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv L Rev 1161, 1191, 1201
(1981) (managerial passivity in response to takeovers best serves stockholder interests);
Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda For
Institutional Investors 31-32, 38, 46-48 (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
Stanford University Law School, 1990) (on file with U Chi L Rev) (proposing a corps of
professional outside directors dependent on institutional stockholders, not management, for
their positions); Louis Lowenstein, What's Wrong with Wall Street: Short-term Gain and
the Absentee Shareholder 209-18 (Addison-Wesley, 1988) (institutional stockholders should
nominate 20-25 percent of board, to encourage their participation in corporate governance).
2 See generally Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and
Private Property (Harcourt, Brace & World, rev ed 1968).
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cess.3 Accordingly, these writers have proposed corporate govern-
ance rules designed to ensure that corporate managers and direc-
tors cannot impede a hostile takeover.
Upon examination, however, the unspoken premises of this
body of academic literature are seriously flawed. First, there is no
basis for the assumption of intrinsic rights and entitlements in the
corporate structure. The Anglo-American corporate form is a crea-
tion of the state, conceived originally as a privilege to be conferred
on specified entities for the public good and welfare. While the cor-
porate form became more widely available as the economy de-
manded it, and is now generally available to any business, it re-
mains a legal creation. As with any legal construct, we must justify
the rules governing it on the basis of economic and social utility,
not intrinsic rights. If alteration of those rules benefits the eco-
nomic system and, in the long run, the corporations themselves,
notions of "intrinsic rights" should not stand in the way.
Second, the academic literature has vastly overstated the ben-
efits of the hostile takeover. Even if one accepts the priority of dis-
ciplining managers, the hostile takeover has proven a particularly
destructive and inefficient means of such discipline. Hostile take-
overs have not led managers to manage more effectively or to cre-
ate more successful business enterprises. Instead, together with the
increasing dominance of institutional stockholders, hostile takeover
activity has led to an inordinate focus on short-term results and a
dangerous overleveraging of the American and British economies,
the ill effects of which are only beginning to emerge.
The present lull in hostile takeover activity provides an oppor-
tunity to reexamine our system of corporate governance relatively
free of the high emotions of the 1980s. But the need for reexamina-
tion remains pressing. While the pace of hostile takeover activity
has slowed, reflecting in part the current recession, hostile take-
overs remain very much a part of the corporate landscape and
managerial thinking. Moreover, the growing power of institutional
stockholders, and their increasing willingness to exercise that
I See, for example, Easterbrook and Fischel, 94 Harv L Rev at 1198 (cited in note 1)
(managerial passivity in response to tender offers forces managers to put stockholder wealth
ahead of their desires to protect their own positions); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case For
Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 Harv L Rev 1028 (1982) (supporting a rule of
auctioneering, rather than passivity, in which incumbent management solicits competing
bids); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defen-
sive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 Stan L Rev 819, 878-79 (1981) (proposing a rule that limits
management's ability to interfere with stockholders' decision to accept or reject tender
offers).
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power, create pressures on corporate managers as great as those
imposed by the last takeover wave. With the early corporate gov-
ernance agenda of institutional stockholders focusing on opposition
to takeover defenses and promotion of short-term profits, it is im-
perative that we reach a collective judgment as to the appropriate
goals of corporate governance and the best means of meeting those
goals.
This Article rejects the approach, which we will refer to as the
"managerial discipline model," that assumes that conformity to
stockholder wishes and protection of hostile takeovers are the pri-
mary goals of corporate governance. Instead, this Article argues
that the ultimate goal of corporate governance is the creation of a
healthy economy through the development of business operations
that operate for the long term and compete successfully in the
world economy. Corporate governance is a means of ordering the
relationships and interests of the corporation's constituents: stock-
holders, management, employees, customers, suppliers, other
stakeholders and the public. The legal rules that constitute a cor-
porate governance system provide the framework for this ordering.
This Article argues that the legal rules, the system of corporate
governance, should encourage the ordering of these relationships
and interests around the long-term operating success of the corpo-
ration. For it is this goal that will ultimately be the most beneficial
to the greatest number of corporate constituents, including stock-
holders, and to our economy and society as a whole.
The system of corporate governance we propose places partic-
ular emphasis on the need for cooperation between managers and
their principal institutional stockholders. The relationship between
managers and stockholders is a problematic one in the modern
public corporation, one that is dominated alternately by apathy
and confrontation. The academic focus on the discipline of manag-
ers threatens to exacerbate the confrontational side of the relation-
ship. What is needed is a system that will lead managers and
stockholders to work cooperatively towards the corporation's long-
term business success.
Part I of this Article examines the premises and flaws of the
managerial discipline model of corporate governance. Part II exam-
ines the interest of the corporation in its long-term success as a
business enterprise, and the harm to corporate and national inter-
ests inflicted by the short-termism that has resulted from changes
in the nature of stock ownership and the rise in hostile takeover
activity. Part III considers alternative approaches to corporate gov-
ernance exemplified by the Japanese and German systems, and
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suggests some of the practical constraints in implementing these
approaches in the United States and United Kingdom economies.
Part IV proposes a new corporate governance system for the
United States and the United Kingdom, designed to balance the
need for a long-term orientation with the need for managerial ac-
countability. This proposal would replace annual elections of direc-
tors with quinquennial elections; bar nonconsensual changes in
control between elections; provide major stockholders with direct
access to the corporate proxy machinery in connection with the
quinquennial election; provide for a detailed five-year report,
which would be independently evaluated by an outside advisor, an-
alyzing the corporation's prior five-year performance and setting
forth its prospective five-year plan; and tie significant management
compensation awards, as well as significant penalties, to the corpo-
ration's performance against the five-year plan.
I. THE MANAGERIAL DISCIPLINE MODEL
The academic community has generally embraced the manage-
rial discipline model of corporate governance, which seeks to con-
form managerial behavior to the wishes of the corporation's stock-
holders and to prevent managers and directors from impeding
hostile takeovers. 4 Judicial norms, for the most part, have also fol-
lowed the view of the supremacy of the stockholder in the corpo-
rate structure.5 Within the last few years, statutory and case law,
largely at the urging of non-academic commentators, has begun to
give legal recognition to the importance of long-term planning and
non-stockholder constituencies in the health of corporations and
the corporate economy." This recognition, however, has been spo-
For examples of the academic view, see sources cited in notes 1 and 3.
8 For examples of the judicial view, see Dynamics Corp. of America v CTS Corp., 794
F2d 250, 256 (7th Cir 1986) (primary criterion for judging legality of poison pill is "the goal
of stockholder wealth maximization"), rev'd on other grounds, 481 US 69 (1987); Revlon Inc.
v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A2d 173, 182, 184 n 16 (Del 1986) (after decid-
ing to sell company, directors may only consider interests of the stockholders); Dodge v
Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich 459, 170 NW 668, 684 (1919) ("A business corporation is organ-
ized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.").
' For examples of commentators' views, see Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in
the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U Pa L Rev 1, 35-43 (1987); William H. Steinbrink,
Management's Response to the Takeover Attempt, 28 Case W Res L Rev 882 (1978);
Nicholas F. Brady, Secretary of the Treasury, Remarks before the Business Council (Feb
22, 1990) (on file with U Chi L Rev). For examples of judicial decisions, see Paramount
Communications, Inc. v Time Inc., 571 A2d 1140, 1153 (Del 1989) (In evaluating a takeover
bid, directors need not maximize short-term stock price and may consider "'the impact on
"constituencies" other than shareholders ... .' ") (quoting Unocal Corp. v Mesa Petroleum
Co., 493 A2d 946, 955 (Del 1985)); TW Services, Inc. v SWT Acquisition Corp., [1989
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radic and non-systematic, and has engendered much criticism from
academic circles.7
In this Part, we analyze three intellectual underpinnings of the
managerial discipline model: the paradigm of the stockholder as
property owner; the notion that managers are self-interested and
require external discipline in order to run their companies well;
and the view that the hostile takeover is an effective instrument of
discipline. We conclude that' each of these concepts is deeply
flawed, and that the managerial discipline model is thus inade-
quate as the basis for a system of corporate governance.
A. The Stockholder as Property Owner
The managerial discipline model of corporate governance rests
in large part on the paradigm of the stockholder as owner of the
corporation, standing in much the same relationship to the corpo-
ration as the owner of any item of private property stands to that
property." One of the fundamental principles of a capitalist legal
system is that the owner of private property may do with that
property as he wishes, so long as he does not harm third parties.
Once one accepts the premise that stockholders own the corpora-
tion in the same manner as they own any other private property,
Transfer Binder] Fed Secur L Rptr (CCH) 94,334 at 92,173 (Del Chanc 1989) (directors
need not pursue immediate maximization of share value by redeeming rights plan at ex-
pense of long-term business plan).
Chancellor William T. Allen of the Delaware Chancery Court noted in a recent speech,
"The assumption that we want corporation law to more perfectly align manager action with
shareholder interest is fundamental to the traditional legal view of the domain of corpora-
tion law. But that assumption was tested in the takeover setting in the 1980s and guess
what? As George Gershwin put it, it ain't necessarily so." William T. Allen, Competing Con-
ceptions of the Corporation in American Law 9 (Rocco J. Tresolini Lecture in Law, Lehigh
University, Oct 29, 1990) (on file with U Chi L Rev). Because about 50 percent of the major
public companies are incorporated in Delaware, the Delaware courts, more than any others,
have been compelled to be the judicial arbiters of the corporate governance debate. Chancel-
lor Allen, in his decisions and speeches, has demonstrated a keen understanding of corpo-
rate governance issues and the ramifications of judicial decisions on the business and poli-
cies of corporations. Together with the Delaware Supreme Court, he has fashioned a series
of decisions, including the Time and TW Services cases cited above, that have enabled
boards of directors to blunt, if not defeat, some of the ill effects of the takeover wave of the
1980s.
See, for example, Easterbrook and Fischel, 94 Harv L Rev at 1190-92 (cited in note 1)
(criticizing the view of some commentators that, in responding to a tender offer, the target
board should consider the interests of various non-investor groups); Gilson, 33 Stan L Rev
at 862-65 (cited in note 3) (rejecting the argument that responsiveness to non-stockholder
constituencies justifies management discretion in preventing tender offers).
0 See, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defen-
sive Tactics, and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus Law 1733, 1733 (1981) ("corporations exist
and conduct their affairs for the benefit of the shareholders").
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the conclusion that the wishes of the stockholders must be the par-
amount focus of the corporation follows, constrained only by the
limitation on injuring third parties embodied in concepts such as
environmental or products liability tort principles. From this start-
ing point, the descriptive observation that separation of ownership
and management is the central characteristic of the modern public
corporation leads to the normative conclusion that the primary
goal of corporate governance is to ensure that managerial actions
conform to the wishes of stockholders. If the corporation is simply
private property for the stockholders to do with as they please, the
directors and managers of the corporation should, ideally, be no
more than implementers of the stockholders' desires.
This line of reasoning, however, suffers from two major flaws.
First, the corporation, particularly the modern public corporation,
is not private property like any other private property.9 Rather, it
is the central productive element of the economies of the United
States and the United Kingdom. The health and stability of these
economies depends on the ability of corporations to maintain
healthy and stable business operations over the long term and to
compete in world markets.' 0 The corporation affects the destinies
of employees, communities, suppliers, and customers. All these
constituencies contribute to, and have a stake in, the operation,
success, and direction of the corporation. Moreover, the nation and
the economy as a whole have a direct interest in ensuring an envi-
ronment that will allow the private corporation to maintain its
long-term health and stability. Rules of corporate ownership and
governance must take account of many more interests than do the
rules governing less complex property.
The origins of the public corporation reinforce this contrast
with ordinary private property. Corporations came into being in
England and the United States as quasi-public entities, granted
legislative charters to serve specific public as well as private pur-
poses." Companies such as the British East India Company and
' Professor Berle divides property into two classifications: (1) consumption property
and (2) productive property-"property devoted to production, manufacture, service or
commerce, and designed to offer, for a price, goods or services to the public from which a
holder expects to derive a return." Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation at xi (cited
in note 2).
"0 Capitalism, The Economist 5, 6 (May 5, 1990) ("Capitalism") ("The proper 'micro'
in microeconomics is the individual firm. How well it does, multiplied by thousands and
millions of times, determines how well the economy does.").
Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation at 120 (cited in note 2). For an overview
of the corporation in American law, see generally Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of
American Law 511-25 (Simon & Schuster, 2d ed 1985).
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the Hudson Bay Company were political instrumentalities as well
as profit-making enterprises. 12 Legislatures granted charters to
early American corporations so that religious, educational, and
charitable organizations could hold property and act as indepen-
dent legal entities. Later charters established banks, canal compa-
nies, aqueduct companies, and other businesses essential for trade
and city development. 13 General incorporation statutes did not be-
come predominant until the late nineteenth century. 4 This au-
thorization of general incorporation rights reflected a policy choice
to encourage the general aggregation of capital by freeing the
owner/stockholders from the risk of unlimited liability.
Given the corporation's origins as a historical and legal con-
struct created for specific public policy reasons, the state naturally
may choose to condition the use of the corporate form upon com-
pliance with rules that advance societal goals, even if those goals
clash with stockholder interests. For example, corporations must
observe laws governing polluting, worker safety, child labor, the
right of workers to unionize, foreign corrupt practices, product
safety, and a host of other corporate behavior that affects society
at large. There is no a priori reason why rules of corporate gover-
nance should not similarly take account of public purposes. To the
extent there is an intrinsic nature to the corporation, it is more
akin to that of a citizen, with responsibilities as well as rights, than
to that of a piece of private property.
Second, the managerial discipline model tends to ignore or dis-
miss the implications for corporate governance of the changing na-
ture of corporate ownership. Just as the corporation is not analo-
gous to ordinary private property, neither is the stockholder in the
modern public corporation analogous to the owner of ordinary pri-
vate property. The stockholder owns an interest in a share of
stock, a financial investment granting no direct control over the
properties, equipment, contract rights, organizational structure,
and other elements that make up the corporation itself. That share
may entitle the stockholder to a percentage of the profits and
12 Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 Harv
L Rev 105, 108-11 (1888).
13 James Willard Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of the
United States 1780-1970 13-20 (Virginia, 1970); Ronald E. Seavoy, The Origins of the
American Business Corporation, (1784-1855) 5-7 (Greenwood, 1982). See also Liggett Co. v
Lee, 288 US 517, 545 (1933) (Brandeis dissenting) (early charters granted only when neces-
sary to procure some specific community benefit).
14 See Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation at 126-27 (cited in note 2) (discuss-
ing the appearance of the early general incorporation statutes).
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residual value of the corporation, but the stockholder's intrinsic
ownership interest is a financial interest, on which there is a return
in the form of dividends or appreciation in trading price, rather
than the "use and enjoyment" interest of the owner of a piece of
personal property.
Moreover, unlike the stockholder/manager of the nineteenth
century corporation or the modern incorporated proprietorship,
the stockholder of the modern public corporation does not behave
as a traditional owner of property. The stockholder/managers of a
closely held corporation have an interest in developing the corpo-
ration, nurturing its business, preserving its strength, and ensuring
its future. Their shares are not publicly traded and are usually not
traded at all. In contrast, the stockholder/investors of the modern
publicly held corporation view the corporation more as the holder
of a betting slip views a racehorse. 5 Just as the bettor does not
really care about the fate of the racehorse as long as it provides
him a financial payoff, so too the stockholder/investor does not re-
ally care about the fate of the corporation as long as the stock gen-
erates a profit.
The paradigm of the stockholder as the owner of private prop-
erty, then, does not provide a compelling basis for the managerial
discipline model of corporate governance. The economic and politi-
cal justifications for our -legal rules of private property do not
transfer automatically to the rules governing the relationship be-
tween stockholder and corporation.' 6 It is simply not a sufficient or
compelling answer to the question of why the desires of stockhold-
ers must be the paramount and controlling focus of the corporation
to say that the stockholders are the owners of the corporation. Of
course, stockholders deserve a prominent voice in corporate gov-
ernance. 7 Indeed, the proposal for a revised corporate governance
system advanced in Part IV looks to stockholders to provide real
and ultimate control over the corporation's direction. But the or-
dering of relationships among corporate constituents that is corpo-
rate governance cannot blindly follow the maxim that stockholders
own the corporation and must be free to do with it as they please.
16 Capitalism at 8 (cited in note 10).
16 As Chancellor Allen states, "The premise of 'ownership' simply assumes but does not
justify an answer." Allen, Competing Conceptions of the Corporation in American Law at
15 (cited in note 6).
17 Professors Gilson and Kraakman assert that "managerialist rhetoric" views the insti-
tutional investor as less than a real stockholder, and one whose interests "may be appropri-
ately ignored." Gilson and Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director at 1 (cited in note
1). This argument is a straw man.
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Rather, we must examine, justify, and if necessary modify our cor-
porate governance system in terms of its impact on stockholders,
the corporation and its other constituents, and the health of our
economic system and society as a whole.
B. The Need for External Discipline
The managerial discipline model assumes that managers are
inherently self-interested and that, left to their own devices, they
will act selfishly and to the detriment of the corporation and its
other constituencies, particularly the stockholders.18 This bias,
however, is simply unfounded. In our experience, most managers
and directors act diligently and in good faith to develop and main-
tain the business success of the corporations they manage or di-
rect.'9 Only the rare manager or director steals, whether literally or
figuratively, from the corporation for personal gain. Certainly, the
problem does not warrant the obsession of many academic writers
with the issue. Of course, diligence and good faith do not ensure
good or successful management. But the kind of discipline contem-
plated by the managerial discipline model, primarily the threat of
takeover or replacement, is directed at the misperceived problem
of managerial selfishness, not managerial ability.
Proponents of the managerial discipline model tend to view
any action taken by managers that conflicts with the wishes of the
stockholders as evidence of managerial self-interest. Thus, they
characterize the adoption of antitakeover devices as management
entrenchment,2 0 and business acquisitions that hurt short-term
earnings as managerial self-aggrandizement. 21 In so doing, they ig-
nore the possibility that, to the extent these actions conflict with
the wishes of stockholders, the divergence may simply reflect dif-
"S See, for example, Easterbrook and Fischel, 94 Harv L Rev at 1169-70 (cited in note
1) (discipline necessary because some managers "will find it advantageous to shirk responsi-
bilities, consume perquisites, or otherwise take more than the corporation promised to give
them"); Gilson, 33 Stan L Rev at 836 (cited in note 3) (managers "can be expected, if other-
wise unconstrained, to maximize their own welfare rather than the shareholders' ").
19 See also Jay W. Lorsch, Pawns or Potentates: The Reality of America's Corporate
Boards 30 (Harvard Business School Press, 1989) ("America's boards are made up of, by
and large, responsible and dedicated directors who take their duties seriously.").
"I See, for example, Easterbrook and Fischel, 94 Harv L Rev at 1175 (cited in note 1)
(To protect their salaries and status, managers of target company "may disguise a policy of
resistance to all offers as a policy of searching for a better offer than any made so far.").
"1 See, for example, Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-It's
Not How Much You Pay, But How, Harv Bus Rev 36, 45 (May-June 1990) ("Executives are
invariably tempted to acquire other companies and expand the diversity of the empire, even
though acquisitions often reduce shareholder wealth.").
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fering perspectives as to the appropriate direction and business
plan of the corporation. While a stockholder seeking a short-term
premium may object to takeover impediments, antitakeover provi-
sions can be a quite rational tool for a board of directors seeking to
preserve the corporation in the face of an attempted takeover that
is likely to be detrimental to the long-term health of its business.
Similarly, while a stockholder with a short-term investment hori-
zon may object to a business combination that initially hurts the
corporation's earnings per share, the business combination may re-
flect the good faith judgment of the corporation's directors and
managers that the step is necessary to position the corporation to
prosper over the long term.
The managerial discipline model also dismisses the substantial
common law and statutory legal strictures already in place that ad-
dress overt self-dealing or self-interestedness. Transactions with
the corporation in which a director or manager has a personal fi-
nancial interest receive close scrutiny.22 Insider trading rules23 and
short-swing profit recovery 24 guard against the misuse of informa-
tion in stock trading by directors and managers. Moreover, sub-
stantial existing financial and social incentives motivate directors
and managers to seek the business success of the corporations they
direct or manage. Incentive compensation based on appreciation of
the stock of the corporation, or based on increasing earnings and
exceeding budget targets, provides managers with financial rewards
22 See, for example, Fliegler v Lawrence, 361 A2d 218, 221 (Del 1976) (where defend-
ants stood on both sides of transaction, burden was on dbfendants to demonstrate transac-
tion's intrinsic fairness to the acquiring firm and its stockholders); AC Acquisitions Corp. v
Anderson, Clayton and Co., 519 A2d 103, 111 (Del Chanc 1986) (board with financial inter-
est in transaction adverse to corporation bears burden of proving the transaction's intrinsic
or objective fairness); Guth v Loft, Inc., 23 Del Chanc 255, 5 A2d 503, 510 (1939) (rule
demands of a director the most scrupulous observance of his duty to "refrain from doing
anything that would work injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage
which his skill and ability might properly bring to it, or to enable it to make in the reasona-
ble and lawful exercise of its powers"). In addition to case law, approximately three-quarters
of the states have enacted statutory provisions governing contracts with interested directors.
See, for example, 8 Del Code Ann § 144 (1990).
2 Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 USC § 78j (1988), and Rule
10b-5 promulgated thereunder, require that an insider who possesses material nonpublic
information about a company make appropriate disclosure of the information or abstain
from trading in the company's stock. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907, 911
(1961).
24 Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 USC § 78p(b), provides for a
rule of strict liability, entitling an issuer to recover any profits realized by a director, officer,
or beneficial owner of ten percent of an issuer's outstanding stock, from the purchase or sale
of any equity security of the issuer.
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tied to the success of the corporation.25 An executive's social sta-
tus, and the respect of fellow executives, typically depend in large
part on the success of the corporation he or she manages. Indepen-
dent directors' reputations, and to some extent their opportunities
to serve on other boards, are tied to the business success of their
corporations.26
The managerial discipline model's emphasis on reining in
managerial self-interest is thus just as flawed as its emphasis on
conforming the actions of managers to the desires of the stockhold-
ers. The greater problem, or challenge, is to design a system that
gives managers the opportunity and the incentive to work in part-
nership with stockholders and the corporation's other constituen-
cies in improving the long-term business performance of the corpo-
ration. The quinquennial proposal advanced in Part IV addresses
this problem.
C. Hostile Takeovers as an Instrument of Discipline
Academic proponents of the managerial discipline model of
corporate governance tend to embrace the hostile takeover as the
primary instrument of managerial discipline. They argue that bad,
inefficient, or self-interested managers, or managers who fail to
heed the wishes of the stockholders, will find themselves vulnera-
ble to a hostile takeover. If the state does not permit incumbent
management to interfere with stockholders' freedom to accept
tender offers, the argument continues, the fear of a hostile take-
over will make bad managers good, inefficient managers efficient,
and self-interested managers responsive to stockholder desires.2 7 In
The quinquennial proposal set forth in Part IV suggests tying these financial incen-
tives to the performance of the corporation over five-year periods as part of the effort to
reorient the corporation towards long-term business performance. See Part IV.E.
26 See Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J Pol Econ
288, 294 & n 3 (1980) (discussing market for outside directors: "Like the professional
outside director, the welfare of the outside auditor depends largely on 'reputation.' "). But
see Gilson and Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director at 22-23 & nn 41-42 (cited in
note 1) (arguing that no effective market for outside directors exists). While perhaps not as
developed as the market for outside auditors, our experience is that reputation is important
in creating opportunities for outside directors.
17 See, for example, Gilson & Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director at 12-13
(cited in note 1) (mere threat of hostile offer is likely to improve target management); Eas-
terbrook and Fischel, 94 Harv L Rev at 1169 (cited in note 1) ("tender bidding process
polices managers whether or not a tender offer occurs"); ALI, Principles of Corporate Gov-
ernance: Analysis and Recommendations part VI at 98 (Tent Draft No 10, 1990)
("[T]ender offers are mechanisms through which market review of the effectiveness of man-
agement's delegated discretion can operate."). See also Finnegan v Campeau Corp., 915 F2d
824, 831 (2d Cir 1990) ("Congress realized 'that takeover bids should not be discouraged
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practice, however, the hostile takeover is not a particularly effec-
tive or efficient means of motivating or disciplining managers.
The enthusiasm for the hostile takeover as the primary instru-
ment of managerial discipline rests heavily on the efficient capital
markets theory that has dominated the academic literature over
the last two decades. This theory holds, in essence, that the market
price of a corporation's stock at any given time accurately reflects
all available information about the corporation and its anticipated
future income stream. Accordingly, the argument continues, the
market can neither undervalue nor overvalue a corporation's
worth.28 The willingness of an acquiror to pay a premium to the
market price, then, necessarily implies that the acquiror can in-
crease the value of the corporation by managing the assets better,
thus demonstrating the inefficiency of the existing management.
In recent years, however, the efficient capital markets theory
has become increasingly discredited, especially since the stock
market crash of October 1987.29 A growing body of economic litera-
ture now accepts that the stock market can and does misprice par-
ticular stocks, groups of stocks, and even stocks in general for ex-
tended periods of time.30 The new literature recognizes the great
degree of subjectivity, and even irrationality, among investors who
set the demand for and the price of stocks.31 Recent literature also
because they serve a useful purpose in providing a check on entrenched but inefficient man-
agement.' ") (quoting legislative history of the Williams Act, S Rep No 90-550, 90th Cong,
1st Sess 3 (1967)).
28 See, for example, Easterbrook and Fischel, 36 Bus Law at 1734 (cited in note 8)
("[T]he notion that stock is priced in the market at less than its true value is implausible.");
Werner F.M. De Bondt and Richard H. Thaler, A Mean-Reverting Walk Down Wall Street,
3 J Econ Persp 189, 189 (1989) ("Few propositions in economics are held with more fervor
than the view that financial markets are 'efficient' and that the prices of securities in such
markets are equal to their intrinsic values.").
29 Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Finance,
4 J Econ Persp 19, 29 (1990) ("[S]tock in the efficient markets hypothesis-at least as it has
traditionally been formulated-crashed along with the rest of the market on October 19,
1987," when "a 22 percent devaluation of the American corporate sector" occurred in one
day.).
30 See Stephen F. LeRoy, Efficient Capital Markets and Martingales, 27 J Econ Lit
1583, 1616 (1989) ("The most radical revision in efficient-markets reasoning will involve
those implications of market efficiency that depend on asset prices equaling or closely ap-
proximating fundamental values. The evidence suggests that, contrary to the assertion of
this version of efficient markets theory, such large discrepancies between price and funda-
mental value regularly occur."); E. Victor Morgan and Ann D. Morgan, The Stock Market
and Mergers in the United Kingdom 74 (David Hume Institute, 1990) ("There are powerful
reasons for believing that equity markets, in the UK and elsewhere, are unlikely to be fun-
damental-valuation efficient but, in view of the difficulty of testing and the paucity of fac-
tual evidence, the question must remain open.").
31 See, for example, Shleifer and Summers, 4 J Econ Persp at 19-20 (cited in note 29)
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examines the effects on pricing of varying levels of information
among investors, varying investor time horizons, varying evalua-
tions of future prospects and risks, and the greater cost and risk of
arbitraging long-term mispricing than short-term mispricing.32
Moreover, tax and accounting effects can cause a corporation's
stock to be underpriced in the market compared to its worth to an
acquiror. These factors all support the conclusion that the public
market may often undervalue the shares of a corporation relative
to the worth an acquiror would place on the shares, even in the
absence of any efficiency gains from the acquisition.
Professors Shleifer and Summers suggest that another source
of takeover activity may be the ability of an acquiror to realize
gains from a "breach of trust" with the corporation's other constit-
("Our approach rests on two assumptions. First, some investors are not fully rational and
their demand for risky assets is affected by their beliefs or sentiments that are not fully
justified by fundamental news. Second, arbitrage-defined as trading by fully rational inves-
tors not subject to such sentiment-is risky and therefore limited."); Gavin C. Reid, Effi-
cient Markets and the Rationale of Takeovers 19-23 (David Hume Institute, 1990) (describ-
ing "bubbles," in which "prices rise rapidly without apparent good reason, trading volumes
accelerate, and prices finally crash," and "fads," in which "social convention or fashion
makes certain assets desirable"); De Bondt and Thaler, 3 J Econ Persp at 199-200 (cited in
note 28) (discussing how "faulty risk perceptions," "a tendency to overreact to recent earn-
ings trends," and "biased" immediate price reaction to negative events may result in market
undervaluation of a corporation's shares: "For companies that experience a series of 'bad
events,' the price correction may take several years.").
32 See Jean A. Crockett, Takeover Attempts, Economic Welfare, and the Role of
Outside Directors (Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research, Wharton School of Fi-
nance, 1989) (on file with U Chi L Rev) (stock prices can undervalue corporations because of
information imperfections and short-term investment horizons); Lynn A. Stout, Are Take-
over Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 Yale L
J 1235, 1295 (1990) (heterogeneous investor valuations create a downward sloping demand
curve for a corporation's shares, which implies that takeover premiums "may be natural
market phenomena rather than evidence of efficiency gains from acquisitions"); Andrei
Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, The New Theory of the Firm: Equilibrium Short Horizons
of Investors and Firms, 80 Am Econ Rev Pap & Proc 148 (1990) (greater cost of arbitrage in
long-term assets compared to short-term assets results in greater mispricing of long-term
assets in equilibrium).
33 Tax rules (particularly the tax deductibility of interest payments and non-deductibil-
ity of dividend payments) and accounting conventions (particularly the capitalization of ac-
quisition costs in contrast to the current charge for the costs of starting a new business,
research and development, and introducing new products) encouraged the acquisitions and
leveraging of the last decade and require reexamination, although we do not undertake that
task here. See Crockett, Takeover Attempts at 5-6 (cited in note 32) ("When we look at the
impact on the economy as a whole, the increment in after-tax earnings for the surviving firm
[in a leveraged transaction] must be offset against the loss to the Treasury and ultimately
the taxpayers. The effect is primarily an income transfer hard to justify on equity grounds.
Furthermore, it is possible that the overall economy will suffer if the higher leverage leads to
a higher rate of bankruptcies or serious financial difficulties in the next recession.").
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uents 4 They point out that a corporation enters into implicit con-
tracts with constituents such as employees and suppliers. In some
circumstances, these implicit contracts may become a liability, but
incumbent managers remain committed to upholding them be-
cause of the trust relationship between the managers and stake-
holders. "In these cases ousting the managers is a prerequisite to
realizing the gains from the breach .... The resulting wealth gains
show up as the takeover premia."3 5 To the extent such breaches of
trust account for the takeover premium, the takeover represents a
wealth transfer and not an efficiency gain. In this manner, "hostile
takeovers can be privately beneficial and take place even when
they are not socially desirable. 3 6
A number of other factors also contributed to the hostile take-
over explosion of the 1980s. For example, the relative ease of ob-
taining acquisition financing and leveraged buyout fund capital al-
lowed acquirors to make risky acquisitions with little of their own
money invested, and thus little downside risk to themselves. 37 The
ease of obtaining financing also extended to takeover arbitrageurs,
who facilitated hostile transactions. 8 And the arrogance and ego of
corporate raiders, seeking to do a bigger or better deal than the
one just announced in the financial press, may also have helped
fuel the takeover wave.39 In sum, it is simply wrong to suggest that
3' Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in
Alan J. Auerbach, ed, Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences 33 (Chicago, 1988).
See also J. Mark Ramseyer, Takeovers in Japan: Opportunism, Ideology and Corporate
Control, 35 UCLA L Rev 1, 63 (1987) ("A hostile acquisition enables a firm's shareholders to
renege on the bargain they initially struck with their managers. In so doing, a hostile acqui-
sition enables the shareholders to appropriate the bulk of any organizational rent the firm
earns, even when that rent results from joint investments by shareholders and managers.").
14 Shleifer and Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in Auerbach, ed, Cor-
porate Takeovers at 41 (cited in note 34).
Id at 34.
3 See, for example, Richard L. Stern and Edward F. Cone, Scarlett O'Hara comes to
Wall Street, Forbes 37 (Sept 21, 1987) (investment banks, commercial banks, and insurance
companies fight to finance LBOs); Sarah Bartlett, Need A Quick Billion or Two? Just Ask
Your Banker, Bus Week 98 (Oct 26, 1987) (big banks providing loans for mergers and LBOs
quickly and in huge amounts); Robert L. Messineo, Proposed SEC Rules May Impact LBO
Funds, NY L J 5 (Sept 21, 1989) ($20 billion committed to LBO funds is used to finance
sizeable transactions on an expeditious basis).
18 See, for example, Allan Sloan, An Extra Slice of the Pie, Forbes 32 (Feb 9, 1987)
(leading takeover arbitrageur Ivan Boesky, together with Drexel Burnham Lambert, raised
$350 million in equity and $660 million in debt for Boesky's takeover arbitrage partnership).
19 See Reid, Efficient Markets and the Rationale of Takeovers at 34 (cited in note 31)
("[I]s it not possible that 'noise trading' is also going on, with pathological propensities to
'do a deal' over-riding considerations of net benefit, and thus of efficiency?").
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bad, inefficient, or self-interested management is the sole or pri-
mary source of this takeover activity.
The anecdotal evidence supports this conclusion. In recent
years, well-managed corporations have been just as likely as poorly
managed corporations to become the target of a hostile takeover.
For example, AMR Corporation (the parent of American Airlines)
became the subject of a takeover attempt by Donald Trump, al-
though the chairman of AMR is generally recognized as the best
manager in the airline industry.40 Georgia-Pacific Corporation ac-
quired Great Northern Nekoosa Corporation even though Great
Northern Nekoosa's return to stockholders for the prior ten years
exceeded that of Georgia-Pacific and the industry as a whole. 41
Georgia-Pacific's stock price and earnings have since declined.42
Even noted raider Sir Gordon White, Chairman of Hanson Indus-
tries, in defending hostile takeover activity, notes: "There are a
large number of companies which are regarded, by and large, as
well run. Of course, these companies can be taken over as the re-
sult of a hostile bid but the shareholders can and do demand a
very high price. 43
If poor or inefficient management is not the primary impetus
for hostile takeovers, it follows that takeovers do not generally mo-
tivate managers to manage better or more efficiently. Rather, the
hostile takeover motivates managers to combat the undervaluation
of their stock by leveraging the corporation, avoiding investments
that do not immediately add to reported earnings, selling assets, or
otherwise boosting short-term earnings, regardless of the possible
harm to the corporation over the long term.44 Even to the extent
4 See Judith H. Dobrzynski, Why Even Well-Run Companies Can Be Easy Prey, Bus
Week 56 (Oct 23, 1989); Erik Hedegaard, Fasten Your Seatbelt, Bob, It's Going to be a
BUMPY Year, M Inc. 61 (Jan 1991) ("American Airlines' Robert Crandall is considered the
best in the business.").
41 See Great Northern Nekoosa Corporation Letter to Shareowners (Nov 13, 1989), filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission as Exhibit 15 to Great Northern Nekoosa
Corporation Schedule 14D-9 (on file with U Chi L Rev).
11 Jacqueline Bueno, Georgia-Pacific Earnings, Stock Price Take a Tumble, Atlanta
Bus Chron 3A (Sept 3, 1990). The authors' law firm represented AMR and Great Northern
Nekoosa in these takeover matters. While these two examples do not demonstrate that all
takeovers are bad, they do undercut any close linkage between takeovers and incentives for
competent management.
4' Sir Gordon White, Why Management Must Be Accountable, Financial Times § 1 at
11 (July 12, 1990).
4 See, for example, Richard Lambert and Anatole Kalestsky, Jam Today Is What
Shareholders Want, Financial Times § 1 at 21 (July 12, 1989) ("The last-ditch defence
against hostile takeovers has thus been for existing managements to steal the raider's thun-
der by arranging a leveraged buy-out and recapitalisation themselves .... Ironically, in
many cases it is the existing management, rather than the outside raider, that ultimately1 ads a company up with greater debts and becomes the more ruthless liquidator."); Chris-
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mismanagement does contribute to hostile takeover activity, the
threat of a hostile takeover is far more likely to create an attitude
of defensiveness on the part of managers than to create an open-
ness to the kind of change and new ideas that might serve to im-
prove business performance.4 5 Some hostile takeovers may replace
bad managers with new ones who may or may not be better. But
the threat of a hostile takeover is unlikely to improve the perfor-
mance of bad managers.46 Finally, as we discuss in Part II, hostile
takeovers and related short-termism have imposed substantial an-'
cillary societal costs.
In sum, the managerial discipline model of corporate govern-
ance is not compelling. We must turn, then, to the examination of
the corporation's proper place in our economy and society, the
challenges for corporate governance, and the question of how best
to reconcile the interests of the corporation's various constituents
and our economy and society as a whole.
II. THE INTEREST OF THE CORPORATION IN ITS LONG-TERM
SUCCESS AND THE SOCIETAL COST OF SHORT-TERMISM
In this Part, we offer an alternative to the managerial disci-
pline model. We argue that the corporation has an independent
interest in its own long-term business success. Classical economic
theory suggests that this interest, multiplied by many individual
topher Farrell, The Bills Are Coming Due, Bus Week 84 (Sept 11, 1989) (USG Corp. "beat
back a takeover raid last year through a $2.2 billion recapitalization .... USG has slashed its
research-and-development staff and expenditures in half, nearly halved capital spending,
cut its work force from 21,000 to 16,000, reduced the management ranks by 10%, and sold
assets worth $600 million-including highly profitable Masonite Corp .... Competitors
smell blood.").
4" John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assess-
ment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 Colum L Rev 1145, 1242-43
(1984) (The work of Douglas McGregor and "a legion of other social scientists" suggests that
"management will be more effective if it creates an environment that stresses support and
encouragement rather than constant threats of dismissal .... In this view, the constructive
deterrent value of the takeover lies more in its ability to function as the corporate guillotine,
amputating swiftly and finally an inefficient management, and less in its general deterrent
effect as a motivating force by which marginal managements are spurred to greater effort.").
46 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 Colum L Rev 1461,
1497-99 (1989) (threat of a takeover may make some managers more efficient, but"'the take-
over market neither adequately aligns the interests of managers and shareholders, nor ade-
quately addresses the problem of managerial inefficiency"); Coffee, 84 Colum L Rev at 1192-
95 (cited in note 45) (capital market is only an effective monitor in cases of massive manage-
rial failure); Michael L. Dertouzos, Richard K. Lester and Robert M. Solow, Made in
America: Regaining the Productive Edge 39 (MIT, 1989) ("Only an extraordinary optimist
could believe, for example, that the current wave of takeover activity is an efficient way to
deal with the organizational deficiencies of American industries.").
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firms, is also society's interest and therefore supplies the proper
organizing principle of corporate governance. The ascendancy of
the institutional stockholder and the hostile takeover, however,
creates an emphasis on short-term results that makes it increas-
ingly difficult for the corporation to maintain the long-term focus
necessary to its own and society's well-being. The efficient capital
markets theory that underlies academic support for takeovers, and
that dismisses the distinction between short-term and long-term
interests, has become increasingly discredited. The short-term bias
imposed by institutional stockholders and takeover activity is real,
and this short-term bias has substantial corporate and societal
costs. In this context, the priorities of the managerial discipline
model threaten to exacerbate the problems of short-termism. In-
stead, our rules of corporate governance require the sort of funda-
mental reform that will align the interests of all corporate constitu-
ents toward the long term.
A. The Interest of the Corporation as a Business Enterprise
At the most basic level, the corporation is no more than a spe-
cific legal form of business enterprise. It is a concatenation of fac-
tors of production-property, equipment, employees, contract
rights, and the like-organized to produce goods and services effi-
ciently. To the extent that the enterprise is able to attract and re-
tain consumers of its products or services who are willing to pay
the enterprise more than it costs to produce the products or ser-
vices, the enterprise will make a profit. The greater the amount of
goods or services the enterprise can sell, and the greater the differ-
ence between what the consumer is willing to pay and what the
goods or services cost to produce, the greater the profit that inures
to the enterprise. Viewed in this light, the corporate enterprise has
an independent interest of its own in the successful operation of its
business, with success measured in terms of present and expected
profit. The notion of "the best interest of the corporation" refers
to this interest in the present and continuing vitality of the
enterprise. 7
Classical economic theory looks to the profit interest of propri-
etors to ensure the health of business enterprises and, in turn, of
47 TW Services, Inc. v SWT Acquisition Corp., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed Sec L Rptr
(CCH) 94,334 at 92,178 (Del Chanc 1989) ("[D]irectors... may find it prudent (and are
authorized) to make decisions that are expected to promote corporate (and shareholder)
long run interests, even if short run share value can be expected to be negatively affected.").
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the national economy.48 This theory holds that the profit motive
drives each proprietor to produce better goods and services more
efficiently than his competitors. As long as private actors have vir-
tually complete freedom to use their resources as they wish, classi-
cal economic theory's invisible hand will cause the best and most
efficient producers to flourish, direct each factor of production to
its best and most efficient use, and lead the economy as a whole to
thrive. This is the basis on which the legal and social system justi-
fies granting free rein to the individual's economic self-interest.
This theory, however, originated in a time when most proprie-
tors owned and managed their own enterprises. 49 Proprietor and
enterprise shared identical interests; by making the enterprise
more successful and profitable, the proprietor reaped a personal
profit. Moreover, the enterprise typically represented the bulk of
the proprietor's economic wealth. The proprietor could not simply
set it aside and turn to some other investment or pursuit without
losing much of his wealth. Accordingly, self-interest dictated that
the proprietor seek to develop and maintain the long-term operat-
ing success of the enterprise.
The separation of ownership and management dramatically al-
ters this theoretical model. No longer does the profit motive of the
corporate owner, with her highly liquid stake and betting-slip
mentality, automatically promote the long-term health of the en-
terprise. Nor does the self-interest and profit motive of the man-
ager, typically insulated from risk by her small ownership stake
and by limited liability, automatically create the most efficient and
profitable corporation possible.
The managerial discipline model focuses sharply on the poten-
tial divergence between managers' interests and the corporation's
interest. But, in so doing, it fails to recognize or consider the impli-
cations of the potential divergence between stockholders' interests
and the corporation's interest. Indeed, most of the academic litera-
ture defines the interest of the corporation in terms of the desires
of stockholders, thereby assuming away the potential divergence.50
As discussed above, however, there is no intrinsic reason that the
conformity to the wishes of the stockholders must be the central
46 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations Book 4, ch 2 at 419-20 (Methuen, 6th ed 1950)
(originally published 1776).
40 Id. See also Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation at 303-08 (cited in note 2).
See, for example, Easterbrook and Fischel, 36 Bus Law at 1733 (cited in note 8)
("The purpose of corporations law is to establish organizing principles under which share-
holders may conduct the enterprise for their own benefit.").
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goal of the corporation. 51 Rather, the justification for granting free
rein to owner or stockholder self-interest, and defining that self-
interest as the interest of the corporation, rests on the classical
economic model in which the stockholder/owner/proprietor links
her long-term economic well-being to the long-term health of the
business enterprise. As and when the underpinnings of this model
change, the conclusions and policy decisions generated by the
model must be reexamined.
An obvious example of the need to reexamine the model and
make periodic adjustments is provided by the development of anti-
trust laws in the United States and the United Kingdom. These
laws, responding to the modern corporation's ability to distort
markets through monopolization or anticompetitive pricing, re-
present an effort to realign the market into conformity with the
assumptions of the classical model. Similarly, the separation of
ownership and management, and the changing nature of owner-
ship, have undermined the invisible hand model. A corporate gov-
ernance system based on this model accordingly becomes problem-
atic. Ultimately, the corporate governance system must realign the
interests of the corporation's stockholders, managers, and other
constituencies to promote the long-term health of the business en-
terprise. Only then will the pursuit of private interest again serve
the public interest as posited by classical economic theory.
B. Short-Termism and the Bias of Institutional Stockholders
The growing dominance of institutional shareholdings, and the
structure within which institutional stockholders now operate, has
virtually ensured the divergence of the interests of stockholders
and those of the corporation. Institutions now hold more than 45
percent of total equities in the United States, and approximately
52 percent of equity in the 500 largest companies .5 The concentra-
tion of institutional ownership in the United Kingdom is even
greater, exceeding 63 percent.5 3 Institutional stockholders have lit-
tle incentive or inclination to behave like traditional owners in the
classical economic model-that is, to work actively towards the
81 See Part I.A.
Carolyn Kay Brancato, The Pivotal Role of Institutional Investors in Capital Mar-
kets: A Summary of Economic Research at the Columbia Institutional Investor Project 21
and Table 7 (Center for Law and Economic Studies, Columbia University School of Law,
1990) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
"' See William Taylor, Can Big Owners Make a Difference?, Harv Bus Rev 70 (Sept-
Oct 1990).
1991]
The University of Chicago Law Review
long-term operating success of the corporation. They tend to focus
instead on the current market price of the corporation's stock.
Most institutional stockholders will support a hostile takeover, a
sale of assets, a leveraging recapitalization, or any other transac-
tion that boosts the immediate price of the corporation's stock.
The critique of short-term bias is a critique not of the motives
or integrity of institutional stockholders, but of the system that
has failed to respond to the changing nature of stock ownership.
While proposing a corps of professional directors to be nominated
and elected by institutional stockholders, Professors Gilson and
Kraakman recognize that institutional stockholders currently have
little opportunity or incentive to take an interest in the long-term
business development of the corporations whose stock they own.5 4
However, they would accept the short-term bias of institutional
stockholders and seek to guarantee that the board of directors, in
the name of heeding the wishes of stockholders, reflects this bias.
In contrast, this Article suggests that the corporate governance
system must attempt to counteract this short-term bias and realign
the interests of stockholders with the interest of the corporation as
an ongoing business enterprise.
Several constraints operate on the institutional stockholder to
produce a short-term bias. First, as their stock portfolios have
grown in size, institutional stockholders have increasingly lost the
ability to assess adequately the business performance of each port-
folio company.5 5 For these stockholders, the market price of the
corporation's stock has become the only important valuation mea-
sure for the corporation, and any step that boosts the short-term
price of a portfolio company's stock has become viewed as intrinsi-
cally desirable.
Second, institutional stockholders assess the performance of
the investment managers who control their stock portfolios over a
short time frame, typically quarter to quarter or year to year, on
the basis of the change in the portfolio's market value during the
specified time period.56 The investment manager trying to out-
perform the market average in each quarter or each year will al-
" Gilson & Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director at 6-8 (cited in note 1).
Id at 6-7 (growth of funds under the management of institutional investors whose
investment strategy is simply to track the general performance of the market reflects the
inability or unwillingness of those stockholders to track the performance of individual cor-
porations); Taylor, Harv Bus Rev at 72 (cited in note 53) ("Of the $40 billion in equities
owned by the New York funds [three pension funds for retired state and local employees],
$30 billion are in indexed portfolios.").
51 See Dertouzos, Lester, and Solow, Made in America at 62 (cited in note 46) (fund
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ways have an incentive to accept, even seek, a short-term premium
for a portfolio stock.57 This competition among investment manag-
ers exacerbates a situation analogous to the "prisoner's dilemma,"
in which cooperation produces optimal results but rational, self-
interested behavior does not.58 Even if the investment manager un-
derstands that stockholders as a whole would be better off encour-
aging and promoting the long-term business development of all
corporations, he will still accept, even seek, short-term premiums
on his portfolio stocks in an effort to outperform competing invest-
ment managers in any given quarter or year.
Finally, the institutional stockholder faces liability constraints.
The typical institutional stockholder has a fiduciary duty to the
beneficiaries of its portfolio and must act solely in their interest.59
While fiduciary status does not intrinsically require a short-term
orientation, to the extent the courts and government agencies such
as the Department of Labor have accepted the managerial disci-
pline model's short-term bias, the institutional stockholder may
fear exposure to liability if it fails to seek or accept the short-term
premium for its portfolio shares.6 0
managers rapidly turn over stock holdings since judged on current value of investment port-
folio). See also Lipton, 136 U Pa L Rev at 7-8 (cited in note 6).
11 See Crockett, Takeover Attempts at 8 & n 8 (cited in note 32) (short time horizons
of institutional stockholders result from "emphasis ... placed on short-term performance in
evaluating and rewarding fund managers").
" See generally Anatol Rapoport and Albert M. Chammah, Prisoner's Dilemma: A
Study in Conflict and Cooperation (Michigan, 1965).
, The Department of Labor (DOL) views the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 USC §§ 1001 et seq (1988), as requiring plan fiduciaries to consider
only the economic interests of the plan participants and beneficiaries in the shares held by
the plan when deciding whether to tender shares in a tender offer. While the DOL has
stated that plan fiduciaries may weigh the long-term value of the target company in this
decision, it also warns that it will monitor plan fiduciaries to ensure that they do not violate
ERISA's requirements and are aware of the liability that can result from any such viola-
tions. See Press Briefing on ERISA and Takeovers, in 6 Pension & Profit Sharing (Prentice-
Hall) 135,649 at 136,971 (1989). See also David George Ball, Assistant Secretary, Pension
& Welfare Benefits Administration, The Importance of Corporate Governance (speech to
United Shareholders' Association, Sept 17, 1990) (on file with U Chi L Rev). In practice, the
DOL's statements have resulted in pressure on plan fiduciaries to tender their shares for the
immediate premium, in order to avoid liability for incorrectly assessing the long-term value
of the target corporation and its prospective return to stockholders.
60 See, for example, statement of David Walker, Assistant Secretary of Labor, in 6 Pen-
sion and Profit Sharing at 136,971 (cited in note 59) (plan fiduciaries must look solely to
economic interests of the pension plan, with purpose of maximizing retirement income for
beneficiaries); Thomas Gilroy and Brien D. Ward, The Institutional Investor's Duty Under
ERISA to Vote Corporate Proxies, in Proxy Contests, Institutional Investor Initiatives,
Management Responses 1990 853, 866 (PLI, 1990) (DOL generally claims that ERISA's
prudence requirement "obligates the fiduciary to consider only economic factors that affect
the value of the plan's investment. For example, the decision to vote for a shareholder initi-
The University of Chicago Law Review
Commentators outside of academic circles have for some time
noted the problem of short-termism.6 Because of the influence of
the efficient capital markets theory, however, the academic litera-
ture has tended to ignore the problem. Under the efficient capital
markets theory, the short-term price of a stock reflects the present
value of the corporation's long-term results. Adherents of this the-
ory thus define out of existence the distinction between short-term
and long-term values or investor orientations. 2
It is only with the recent undermining of the efficient capital
markets theory 3 that the academic literature, particularly the eco-
nomic literature, has begun to examine the effects of short-term
biases and short-term investment horizons. Professors Shleifer and
Vishny, for example, have demonstrated that the short time hori-
zons of arbitrage investors, who focus on short-term assets because
they are relatively less expensive to arbitrage, may result in severe
market underpricing of a corporation's equity. This phenomenon
in turn imposes a short time horizon on managers, who avoid long-
term investments that depress share prices over the short term and
that thus make the corporation vulnerable to hostile takeover.6
They conclude that the "clustering" of arbitrage on the trading of
short-term assets "leads to systematically more accurate pricing of
short-term assets than of long-term assets, even though efficient
capital allocation and managerial evaluation might be better
served by the opposite bias."65
Other academic writers identify additional sources of short-
term pressures and biases. Stephen LeRoy points to the recent
literature on cognitive psychology for the proposition that stock-
holders "systematically overweight current information and under-
weight background information, 66 thus producing an artificially
ative in the belief that it will support management's commitment to stimulate job growth in
a targeted sector of the economy may, in the DOL's view, violate [the fiduciary duty].").
ERISA provides that a plan fiduciary is "personally liable" for any breach of fiduciary duty.
ERISA § 409(a), 29 USC § 1109(a). This provision may be enforced either by a plan partici-
pant or beneficiary or by the Department of Labor. ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 USC §
1132(a)(2).
61 See, for example, John G. Smale, What About Shareowners' Responsibility?, Wall St
J 24 (Oct 16, 1987) ("by focusing on the short term, our publicly held business enterprises
will see their competitive position decay"); Alan Greenspan, Takeovers Rooted in Fear,
Wall St J 28 (Sept 27, 1985) ("Excessively high discount factors place a disproportionate
share of the value of a company's stock on near-term earnings and dividend flows.").
82 See note 28 and accompanying text.
63 See notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
Shleifer and Vishny, 80 Am Econ Rev Pap & Proc at 148 (cited in note 32).
66 Id at 153.
66 LeRoy, 27 J Econ Lit at 1616 (cited in note 30).
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high discount rate for future earnings estimates. Jeremy Stein cites
"informational asymmetry" as leading to undervaluation of pro-
ductive assets that do not contribute to current earnings, forcing
managers to take short-term steps such as selling the asset or
leveraging against it in order to "signal" the value of the asset.17
The anecdotal evidence, particularly in connection with the re-
action of share prices to short-term earnings, also supports the
view of a short-term bias in the market. Recent examples include
Tambrands Inc., whose share price dropped precipitously on the
announcement of a capital spending and marketing program that
caused analysts to reduce 1990 and 1991 earnings estimates. An
investment banker explained, "'Some of their marketing programs
were just a little more long-term in nature' than had been ex-
pected. . . . 'Some analysts were expecting more immediacy in
terms of earnings growth.'-"68 Similarly, Motorola Inc.'s share
price plunged following the announcement of lower-than-expected
earnings for the third quarter of 1990, due primarily to substantial
research and development expenses, notwithstanding the fact that
Motorola's historical strategy of investing for the future had
"helped move it from an old-line television and radio maker in the
1950s and 1960s into a global leader in wireless communications." 69
An 83-year old investment manager, who had been investing in
Motorola since 1955, said he had seen the mistake before: "'I have
never tried to pinpoint the exact amount of quarterly earnings
ahead,' he said. 'That's not important to me.' ,,7o Given the domi-
nance of institutional shareholdings, these market reactions are
clearly an indication of the institutional stockholders' response to
these short-term earnings declines. A report on Warren Buffett's
investment in Wells Fargo Corporation highlighted the scarcity of
long-term institutional investors when it quoted a broker who said,
"Buffett is a long term investor with a three to five year time hori-
zon-a time frame that most institutional investors can't afford. '71
Disagreeing with the assertion that institutional shareholders
hold a short-term perspective, a study commissioned in the United
67 Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J Pol Econ 61, 62-63
(1988).
43 Lourdes Lee Valeriano, Estimates Lowered for Tambrands; Share Price Sags, Wall
St J A10 (Nov 16, 1990).
"' Robert L. Rose, Motorola Profit Report Depresses Stock, Wall St J A8 (Oct 10,
1990).
70 Id.
7' Buffett's Stake in Wells Fargo Doesn't Mean Stock's Bottomed, Portfolio Letter 3
(Oct 29, 1990).
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Kingdom by the Institutional Fund Managers' Association argues
that managers and directors themselves generate a short-term out-
look, in part because they wrongly believe that institutional inves-
tors share this bias.72 While evidence of the actual short-term bias
of institutional stockholders is strong, the adverse consequences of
short-termism may flow just as easily from a perceived short-term
bias. To the extent the quinquennial proposal outlined in Part IV
can promote a continuing dialogue between managers and institu-
tional stockholders, any misperceptions that exist can be
minimized.
The focus on the short term has come at the expense of the
long-term planning, investment and business development of the
corporation. When managers seek to boost the short-term earnings
and stock price, the easiest expenditures to forego are investments
in the future. Thus, corporations have sacrificed research and de-
velopment expenses, capital expenditures, market development,
and new business ventures, simply because they promise to pay off
only in the long term.73 David Walker of the Bank of England
points to "an attitude that attention to the longer run is a luxury
and risk that can be indulged only within tight limits, especially by
companies that see themselves as potential takeover targets. 1 4 In-
stead, managers channel resources to projects expected to produce
immediate results, or to financial measures, such as stock repur-
chase programs, designed to boost short-term earnings. The long-
72 Paul Marsh, Short-Termism on Trial 50-53 (Institutional Fund Managers' Associa-
tion, 1990).
" See R & D Spending Growth Continues to Slow, Res Tech Mgmt 2 (Mar-Apr 1990)
(period from 1980-85 saw annual rate of increase in American corporate research and devel-
opment spending of 8.2%, while period from 1985-90 shows real increases averaging less
than one-fifth that rate); NSF Implicates LBOs in Corporate R&D Cuts-Others Not So
Sure, Res Tech Mgmt 2 (May-June 1989) (National Science Foundation's 1987 survey indi-
cates that acquisitions, mergers, and other restructurings hurt the research and develop-
ment performance of those industries in which they occurred); Bronwyn H. Hall, The Im-
pact of Corporate Restructuring on Industrial Research and Development, in Martin Neil
Baily and Clifford Winston, eds, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics
1990 85, 123 (Brookings, 1990) ("Regardless of whether one believes that leverage is effi-
ciency enhancing or that it leads to a decline in productive investment, the link between
leverage and reduced R & D spending has been established."). But see Margaret Menden-
hall Blair, A Surprising Culprit Behind the Rush to Leverage, Brookings Rev 19 (Winter
1989/90) (citing high real interest rates, rather than short-term bias, as chief deterrent to
new investment and chief cause of shift to debt financing). It is unclear, however, whether
interest rates would have been so high during the 1980s but for the speculative binge of
which the takeover and leveraging wave was a part.
"' David Walker, Capital Markets and Industry, Bank of England Q Bull 573 (Dec
1985), quoted in Morgan and Morgan, The Stock Market and Mergers in the United King-
dom at 94-95 (cited in note 30).
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term adverse effect of these measures on the ability of our corpora-
tions to compete against business enterprises whose ownership
structures, and whose countries' economies, promote investment in
the future is apparent and becoming more severe.
In his monumental study of global competition, Michael E.
Porter identifies the growth of institutional investors in the United
States to a position of dominance over the major business corpora-
tions as the most significant factor in the decline of American
industry:
Unlike institutional investors in nearly every other advanced
nation, who view their shareholdings as nearly permanent and
exercise their ownership rights accordingly, American institu-
tions are under pressure to demonstrate quarterly apprecia-
tion. Pension consultants have grown up that collect fees by
assisting funds in changing asset managers whose recent per-
formance is deemed inadequate. Asset managers, in turn, re-
ward their employees based on the appreciation of their port-
folio in the last quarter or year. With a strong incentive to
find companies whose shares will appreciate in the near term
and incomplete information about long-term prospects, port-
folio managers turn to quarterly earnings performance as per-
haps the single biggest influence on buy/sell decisions.
Managers have become preoccupied with heading off take-
overs through boosting near-term earnings or restructuring.
While restructuring has often led to beneficial sales of un-
derperforming assets, cost cutting, and sometimes the weeding
out of poor managements, the completion of restructuring
starts the same pressures running again. The taking on of sub-
stantial debt in the course of restructuring, with proceeds
paid to shareholders instead of invested in the business as was
the case in highly leveraged Japanese companies, often leads
to risk aversion and a slowing of true strategic innovation. 5
The focus on the short term has also led to the overleveraging
of our economy.76 The last decade saw an unprecedented wave of
75 Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations 528-29 (Macmillan,
1990).
11 See Farrell, Bus Week at 84 (cited in note 44) (There "is growing evidence that steep
leverage is beginning to hobble management, a worrisome trend because Corporate America,
in this decade, has retired nearly $500 billion in equity while piling on almost $1 trillion in
debt."). While determining the "right" level of debt is difficult, the leveraging wave of the
last decade is particularly disturbing in that, historically, in times of economic expansion,
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leveraged transactions, in the form of debt-financed acquisitions,
leveraged buyouts, and leveraged recapitalizations. These transac-
tions resulted in large measure from the demand for short-term
stock premiums, regardless of the long-term consequences. In the
rush to profit from leveraging or breaking up the corporation, ac-
quirors and stockholders ignored the long-term implications of
these actions. Leveraged transactions allow the acquiror to pay a
premium to acquire a corporation using the corporation's own as-
sets as collateral. They allow the corporation to boost short-term
value by paying stockholders a large special dividend, or to boost
short-term stock prices by repurchasing a large portion of its stock.
But these leveraged transactions also exacerbate the need to cut
expenditures and future investments in order to produce short-
term cash flow, and leave our corporations less able to weather eco-
nomic downturns. The bankruptcies and workouts now in the news
are the legacy of these leveraged transactions."
The increasing activism of institutional stockholders may well
worsen the corporations' preoccupation with the short term. Influ-
ential groups such as the Council of Institutional Investors, the
California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS), and
the United Shareholders' Association have historically promoted
takeovers. Organized by these groups, large numbers of institu-
tional stockholders have increasingly embarked on proxy voting
agenda designed to remove takeover defenses and other impedi-
ments to takeover premiums.7 While takeover defenses have no
intrinsic merit, they often provide the only means by which a cor-
debt levels have decreased, providing a cushion for the next downturn. See Henry Kaufman,
The Great Debt Overload Will Keep the Recovery Feeble, Fortune 23 (Dec 31, 1990) ("The
credit quality of American corporations deteriorated throughout the just-ended business ex-
pansion. That is unprecedented; normally the financial condition of business improves when
the economy grows.").
77 See Business Failures Increase 14.5% in First 9 Months, Wall St J B2 (Nov 2, 1990)
(recent report by Dun & Bradstreet indicates that United States business failures rose
14.5% in the first nine months of 1990, to 43,836); Sharon Reier, A Banquet for Fat Cats:
Bankruptcy, Financial World 36 (Oct 16, 1990) (blaming LBOs for the fact that the past
two years have produced 13 of the nation's 25 largest bankruptcies, accounting for close to
$50 billion in assets); Daniel Wise, Workouts, Bankruptcy Work Replacing Junk Bonds
Practices, NY L J 1 (Nov 2, 1989); Fred R. Bleakley, Many Firms Find Debt They Piled On
in 1980s Is a Cruel Taskmaster, Wall St J Al (Oct 9, 1990) (belt tightening engendered by
debt load is forcing cutbacks in capital expenditures, new ventures, and new product lines,
and could deepen the unfolding slump in the United States economy).
78 See Investor Responsibility Research Center, Inc., Major 1990 Corporate Govern-
ance Shareholder Proposals (Feb 20, 1990) (on file with U Chi L Rev) (listing by sponsor
proposals to redeem rights plans, opt out of state antitakeover laws, prohibit greenmail, ban
golden parachutes, reduce supermajority requirements, etc.).
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poration and its directors and managers can seek to protect the
long-term business needs of the enterprise against the pressure for
short-term premiums. To the extent these defenses are removed
without taking steps to reorient the stockholders' perspective to
the long term, the ill effects of the current short-term bias will be
exacerbated.
Similarly, CalPERS and the United Shareholders' Association
have proposed comprehensive revisions of the SEC's proxy rules,
intended to increase the role of institutional investors in the proxy
process and corporate governance.79 Any reform in this area, how-
ever, must be part of a larger effort to reorient stockholders toward
a long-term perspective. Otherwise, the increased activism of insti-
tutions in the proxy process is likely to promote a continued short-
term outlook, with all its negative consequences."0
C. Hostile Takeovers and Short-Termism
The hostile takeover wave of the last decade both caused and
resulted from stockholders' short-term bias. A dominant stock-
holder population anxious to accept a takeover premium encour-
ages the hostile acquiror with the likelihood that a premium bid
will succeed or that a higher bid will prevail, allowing the first po-
tential acquiror to profit on shares of the corporation it purchased
prior to making its bid. Moreover, the short-term bias tends to re-
sult in greater discounting by the market of the long-term profits
of the firm, leaving the market valuation of the corporation well
below the true value of the enterprise. The acquiror is thus able to
make a bid that is below the corporation's value (measured in
terms of the future income streams but discounted at a lower rate
than that typically produced by the short-term bias). Yet the bid,
"' See letter from CalPERS to Linda C. Quinn, Director, Division of Corporation Fi-
nance, Securities and Exchange Commission (Nov 3, 1989), reprinted in Institutional Inves-
tors: Passive Fiduciaries to Activist Owners 454 (PLI, 1990); letter from United Sharehold-
ers' Association to Edward H. Fleischman, Commissioner, Securities and Exchange
Commission (Mar 20, 1990), reprinted in id at 485. Compare letter from The Business
Roundtable to Linda C. Quinn, Director, Division of Corporation Finance, Securities and
Exchange Commission (Dec 17, 1990) (on file with U Chi L Rev) (opposing revisions to the
proxy rules).
80 Philip R. Lochner, Jr., Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission, Improv-
ing Corporate Governance for the Nineties: The Role of Institutional Investors and Proxy
Reform 6 (speech to City Club, Sept 20, 1990) (on file with U Chi L Rev) (If proposed proxy
reforms are adopted and provide institutional stockholders with greater power to influence
boards, institutions might "use their newfound muscle ... to break up and sell off compa-
nies in order to yield higher short-term returns.").
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so long as it is at a premium to the market, is likely to be well
received by stockholders.
At the same time, takeover activity has fueled the short-term
orientation of institutional stockholders. Takeover premiums pro-
vide the fast return on financial equity investments that institu-
tional stockholders desire. Support of hostile takeover activity has
provided a focal point for the expression of short-term interests,
exemplified by the spate of stockholder-sponsored proxy proposals
in opposition to rights plans and other takeover defenses.8 1 And
the threat of hostile takeovers fuels the pressure on directors and
managers to increase short-term earnings and cash flow, regardless
of the impact on long-term business planning and development.
The hostile takeover activity of the last decade has also im-
posed severe dislocations and costs on the corporation's non-stock-
holder constituencies. A hostile takeover often brings with it staff
reductions and layoffs. It may involve selling off operating units or
shutting down offices or operations. These actions frequently harm
the communities affected. 2 The hostile takeover may also contract
the relevant product market, causing disruptions or dislocations
for customers and suppliers. These costs, while not by themselves
dispositive, add further weight to the case for corporate govern-
ance reforms that will discourage the reemergence of takeover
mania.
D. The Interests of Other Constituencies
Largely in response to the impact of hostile takeover activity
on the corporation's non-stockholder constituencies, twenty-nine
state legislatures have enacted legislation permitting boards of di-
rectors to consider and act on the interests of these various corpo-
81 See Investor Responsibility Research Center, Inc., Major 1990 Corporate Govern-
ance Shareholder Proposals (cited in note 78); Emile Geylein and Richard Koenig, Pension
Funds Plot Against Takeover Law, Wall St J C1 (Apr 5, 1989) (describing attempts of three
large pension funds, through stockholder proposals, to cause corporations to opt out of Dela-
ware antitakeover statute).
82 See, for example, Susan C. Faludi, Safeway LBO Yields Vast Profits but Extracts a
Heavy Human Toll, Wall St J Al (May 16, 1990) (following Safeway's defensive LBO,
63,000 workers and managers were laid off); George Anders, Morgan Stanley Found A Gold
Mine of Fees By Buying Burlington, Wall St J Al (Dec 14, 1990) (highly leveraged takeover
of Burlington Industries, Inc., to rescue the company from the advances of corporate raider
Asher Edelman, resulted in the selling off of twenty of Burlington's businesses and the
shrinking of Burlington's work force from 44,000 before the bid to 27,500 several years
later); Shleifer and Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers in Auerbach, ed, Corpo-
rate Takeovers at 50-51 (cited in note 34) (describing community costs to Youngstown, Ohio
'l-owing acquisitions of Youngstown Sheet and Tube and Lykes Steamship Company).
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rate constituencies.83 Some have criticized these statutes on the
basis that they call upon directors to set social policy, a task be-
yond the directors' proper powers."4 Constituency statutes, how-
ever, should not be viewed as giving directors a mandate to make
social policy. Rather, they merely permit directors to take into ac-
count the interest and role of non-stockholder constituencies in the
corporation's long-term vitality. Suppliers, customers, employees
and communities all prosper in the long run if the enterprise pros-
pers in the long run: suppliers retain a strong consumer of their
products, customers retain a strong producer of desired goods or
services, employees retain a healthy employer, and communities
retain a vital contributor to their economic and fiscal health. Con-
stituency statutes empower a board of directors to consider these
interests in adopting a "just say no" response to a takeover bid: if
the board determines that it best serves the corporation's long-
term interests to remain independent, it can refuse to remove im-
pediments to the bid.
Constituency statutes, then, are best understood as a means of
permitting boards of directors to consider the interests of the cor-
poration as a business enterprise, rather than solely the desires of
the stockholders. They respond to the divergence of the stockhold-
ers' interests and the corporation's interests resulting from the sep-
aration of ownership and management and from the dominance of
institutional ownership. They are, however, at best a stopgap
measure. The real need is for a realignment of the interests of
stockholders and corporations around the long-term health of the
business enterprise. In the next Part, we seek better models for
carrying out this task.
8 The concept that the interests of non-stockholder constituencies should be taken
into account in the takeover context was developed in academic literature and case law prior
to the enactment of constituency statutes. See, for example, Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids
in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus Law 101, 130 (1979); Unocal Corp. v Mesa Petroleum
Co., 493 A2d 946, 955 (Del 1985). For examples of constituency statutes following this con-
cept, see Ill Ann Stat ch 32, § 8.85 (Smith-Hurd Supp 1990); NJ Stat Ann § 14A: 6-1 (West
Supp 1990); NY Bus Corp Law § 717 (Law Co-op Supp 1989); 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann §
1721(c) (Purdon Supp 1990).
88 See, for example, Committee on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Po-
tential for Confusion, 45 Bus Law 2253, 2270 (1990) ("[A]Ilocations of wealth (which essen-
tially a balancing of the interests of various constituencies would be) are political decisions"
which are "beyond the general pale of [directors'] perceived mandate from society.") (em-
phasis in original). See also Amanda Acquisition Corp. v Universal Foods Corp., 877 F2d
496, 500 & n 5 (7th Cir 1989) (Easterbrook) (no policy need to protect non-stockholder
corporate constituencies, because acquiror is no more likely than incumbent management to
injure these constituencies).
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III. THE REALIGNMENT OF INTERESTS: LESSONS FROM
HOME AND ABROAD
A long-term view on the part of stockholders and managers is
necessary to permit public corporations in the United States and
the United Kingdom to invest in the future, maintain their vital-
ity, and compete in the world economy.8 5 Corporations must be
permitted to sacrifice some immediate value to investments in cap-
ital assets, research and development, new ventures, or market
share. To the extent the corporation is not permitted to invest in
the future, it will inevitably lose customers and profits to those
corporations that are permitted to do so."6 In this Part, we discuss
elements of the Japanese and German systems of corporate gov-
ernance, and the "patient capital" approach of American investor
Warren Buffett, to demonstrate the advantages of long-term
emphasis.
A. The Need for a Long-Term View
The long-term health of the business enterprise is ultimately
in the best interests of stockholders, the corporation's other con-
stituencies, and the economy as a whole. The institutional stock-
holder typically invests in a large number of stocks whose overall
performance, like that of index funds, tends to mirror the perform-
ance of the market and the economy."7 Moreover, the large institu-
" Brady, Remarks before the Business Council at 2 (cited in note 6) (American corpo-
rations "can't innovate and produce the products needed to capture world markets by focus-
ing on results one quarter at a time."); Alan 0. Sykes, Corporate Takeovers-the Need for
Fundamental Rethinking 21 (David Hume Institute, 1990) ("The inevitable consequence of
'City' short-termism is long-term damage to the City on the back of far greater long-term
damage to the [United Kingdom's] corporate sector as a whole."); Lord Alexander of
Weedon, Q.C., Chairman of National Westminster Bank'and former Chairman of the City
Takeover Panel, The Changing Nature of Finance 9 (speech for the Lombard Association
60th Anniversary Dinner, Oct 4, 1990) (on file with U Chi L Rev) ("Concern about takeovers
may inhibit medium- to long-term planning and, as some say, research and development.
The future of companies may undoubtedly be settled on the basis of short-term
considerations.").
88 See, for example, John J. Curran, Hard Lessons from the Debt Decade, Fortune 76
(June 18, 1990) ("Says Douglas Watson, head of industrial ratings at Moody's Investors
Service: 'I've been seeing signs that once a company leverages, it invites predatory behavior
from its rivals.' For example, most major supermarket chains are stocked to their fluorescent
lights with debt. Thus they're in no shape to respond as A&P, one of the few grocers with a
clean balance sheet, aggressively expands into their markets.").
" Gilson and Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director at 6-8 (cited in note 1) (in-
stitutional investors increasingly "hold the market," whether through indexing or simply by
virtue of the size of their portfolios, thereby eliminating the likelihood of benefits from ac-
tive trading).
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tional stockholder is a long-term investor in the market as a whole.
Unless it divests itself of equities altogether, it will have an equity
stake in a substantial portfolio of corporations regardless of how
long it maintains a stake in any one corporation. To the extent the
economy as a whole thrives over the long term, the portfolio should
thrive, regardless of the performance of, or the availability of take-
over premiums for, any individual stock.
Professors Gilson and Kraakman cite several studies for the
proposition that takeovers provide long-term benefits to stockhold-
ers. "[O]n average," they claim, "target shareholders lose signifi-
cantly when offers are defeated and the company is not subse-
quently acquired by an alternative bidder .... [T]he data resolves
the charge that a favorable orientation to premium tender offers
reflects a short-term orientation."'8 It is unclear, however, why one
should limit the sample to companies "not subsequently acquired
by an alternative bidder." The corporation that defeats a takeover
bid retains the value of control, on which it may realize a premium
by selling the corporation at any time. The corporation that is ac-
quired, of course, loses the asset of control.
More importantly, all the studies cited by Professors Gilson
and Kraakman necessarily measure stock market effects within the
existing system of corporate governance. In the current environ-
ment, corporations that successfully defeat a takeover attempt (as
well as corporations seeking to avoid a takeover attempt) may take
steps to boost short-term earnings or value whether or not these
steps are in the long-term interests of the corporation. The studies
cannot measure the benefits of a new system that would encourage
all the corporation's constituencies to work toward the long-term
success of the corporate enterprise. It may well be rational under
the current system for any individual investment manager to focus
on short-term results, 9 but the short-term bias remains irrational
for the economy as a whole.
The takeover activity of the last decade did not enhance the
development of productive assets. Instead, it produced a reshuf-
fling of assets, large gains to the sponsors of and advisors to the
reshuffling, large gains (and losses) to the arbitrageurs who bet on
the outcome of the transactions, substantial societal dislocations,
and a legacy of heavy debt burdens."' In some cases takeovers did
88 Id at 11 & n 16.
See text at notes 55-60.
90 Lester C. Thurow, Let's Put Capitalists Back into Capitalism, Sloan Mgmt Rev 67,
68 (Fall 1988) (lack of productivity growth during takeover era demonstrates that acquisi-
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shift assets to more efficient uses, but the studies that claim take-
overs generally have this positive effect tend to measure very short
time spans, not long-term effects. 91 Even some proponents of hos-
tile takeovers doubt that they are the best way to bolster the long-
term health and productivity of our corporate economy.92 The
healthy economies of Japan and Germany result in large part from
effective, stable management and long-term capital investment.93
Unless the corporate governance systems of the United States and
the United Kingdom can engender a similar long-term orientation,
the relative health of American and British corporations, and the
relative wealth of their stockholders, will inevitably erode.
The following illustrations are not intended to imply that ei-
ther the Japanese or German corporate regime can or should be
transplanted to the American or British corporate setting. Rather,
these examples are meant to demonstrate successful alternatives to
the managerial discipline model of corporate governance.
B. Japan and Germany
There are many reasons for the economic health and success
of Japan and Germany relative to the United States and the
United Kingdom. 4 It is not possible, of course, to determine pre-
tions are a redistributive activity, not a productive activity); Stout, 99 Yale L J 1235 (cited
in note 32) (takeover premiums may be a natural market phenomenon rather than evidence
of efficiency gains).
91 See, for example, Gregg A. Jarrell, James A. Brickley, and Jeffrey M. Netter, The
Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J Econ Persp 48, 66
(1988) ("premiums in takeovers represent real wealth gains, and are not simply wealth redis-
tributions"); Michael C. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, Mid-
land Corp Fin J 6, 6 (1986) (attributing takeovers to "productive entrepreneurial activity
that improves the control and management of assets and helps move assets to more produc-
tive uses").
92 See, for example, Gilson and Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director at 14
(cited in note 1) ("the hostile takeover is an expensive and inexact tool for monitoring man-
agers that is better suited for correcting mistakes than preventing them").
93 See Evan Herbert, How Japanese Companies Set R&D Directions, Res Tech Mgmt
28 (Sept-Oct 1990) (Japanese corporate governance system enables corporations to suffer
prolonged losses until R&D pays off); Brian O'Reilly, America's Place in World Competi-
tion, Fortune 80 (Nov 6, 1989) (In 1987, Japan's capital spending was approximately 22
percent of GDP, West Germany's was approximately 17 percent of GDP, and the United
States' and the United Kingdom's were approximately 13 percent of GDP.).
9' Factors that have been cited include higher levels of saving, lower costs of capital,
and cultural work ethics. See generally G.C. Allen, The Japanese Economy (St. Martin's,
1981) (emphasizing the importance of political and social factors in Japan's economic
growth); Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations at 368-82 (cited in note 75) (educa-
tion, research, and worker commitment, as well as corporate governance structure and na-
ture of capital markets, contributed to German economic success).
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cisely the degree to which any given factor has contributed to this
success. Many commentators agree, however, that an important
factor is their corporate governance schemes.95 At a minimum, Ja-
pan and Germany provide notable examples of alternatives to the
managerial discipline model of corporate governance, chosen by
two countries whose modern economies have been among the most
successful in the world. Japan and Germany have created systems
akin to what has been termed "proprietor-capitalism," the sort of
capitalism envisioned by classical economic theory, in which stock-
holders are knowledgeable and actively involved in ensuring the
quality of management.9 s These systems stand in contrast to the
"punter-capitalism" of the United States and the United King-
dom, in which stockholders typically remain uninvolved in assess-
ing and developing the business operations and management of
their corporations, except when it comes to the opportunity to re-
ceive the short-term premium of a takeover. 7
1. Japan: Control through the keiretsu.
The Japanese model centers around the keiretsu, a voluntary
grouping of firms and financial institutions with cross-sharehold-
ings and business relationships:
[Members of the keiretsu] hold non-controlling stock in each
other's firms. In addition, shares are owned by banks and life
insurance companies with the expectation of assured long-
term business relationships. In Japan, corporations and finan-
cial institutions together hold about two-thirds of all stock
listed on all exchanges. Often the majority of shares in a cor-
poration are collectively owned by members of the same in-
dustrial group or keiretsu.98
This cross-shareholding, together with major shareholdings by the
corporation's lenders, provides stability and a long-term orienta-
tion for Japanese corporations, leaving roughly 25 percent of
91 See, for example, Capitalism at 17 (cited in note 10); Sykes, Corporate Takeovers at
12-13 (cited in note 85); Dertouzos, Lester, and Solow, Made in America at 61-62 (cited in
note 46); Brady, Remarks before the Business Council (cited in note 6); Jonathan
Charkham, The American Corporation and the Institutional Investor: Are There Lessons
From Abroad? Hands Across the Sea, 1988 Colum Bus L Rev 765, 766.
98 Capitalism at 7 (cited in note 10).
97 Id.
" Aron Viner, Mergers, Acquisitions and Corporate Governance in Japan, in Joseph
C.F. Lufkin and David Gallagher, eds, International Corporate Governance 27 (Euromoney
Books, 1990).
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shares available for everyday trading.99 The concentration of
shareholdings creates a monitoring body that can assess the busi-
ness performance of the corporation and its managers. 100 But the
business relationships among the keiretsu, primarily lending, cus-
tomer, and supplier relationships, ensure the alignment of interests
around the long-term business health and vitality of the corpora-
tion. This structure insulates the management of Japanese corpo-
rations against the short-term pressures felt by managers in the
United States and the United Kingdom.' 0'
2. Germany: Control through bank intermediation.
While quite different from that of Japan, the German corpo-
rate governance structure leads to the same result. Stock owner-
ship of public corporations in Germany is largely through bank in-
termediaries that vote the shares they hold for others. Voluntary
delegation of voting rights to portfolio-managing banks is the norm
among private investors, except for major stockholders. For widely-
held corporations these banks account for over 90 percent of voting
rights, with the three largest banks controlling the voting rights of
over 40 percent of all shares.0 2 The banks also own shares in their
own right and often hold seats on corporate supervisory boards,
99 Capitalism at 17 (cited in note 10). See also Tony Shale, Reawakening the Sleeping
Giant, Euromoney 14, 17 (Nov 1990) ("of the 1,612 companies presently listed on the Tokyo
Stock Exchange, 1,100 belong to keiretsu groupings and account for 78% of market
capitalisation").
100 See Ramseyer, 35 UCLA L Rev at 49-50 (cited in note 34) (Japanese shareholders
have greater incentive to monitor managers as they generally hold large blocks of stock due
to the cross-shareholding practices in Japan. In addition, Japanese banks have proved to be
effective monitors of the corporations with which they have ongoing financial dealings.).
101 See id at 21-32 (Several factors combine to make hostile acquisitions in Japan a
relatively unprofitable, and therefore, rare occurrence: (1) the practice of cross-shareholding
in corporation stocks increases the cost of obtaining a controlling block of shares; (2) the
higher leverage of Japanese firms gives the lending bank the ability to bargain with the
potential acquiror for a portion of the gains; and (3) the absence of a provision in Japanese
law allowing the acquiror to cash out minority shareholders after the bid permits sharehold-
ers to free-ride on any efficiency gains resulting from the acquisition.). See also Martin Lip-
ton, Paying the Price of Takeover Money 34, Manhattan, inc. (May 1989) (quoting a 1988
speech by Masaaki Kurokawa, the chairman of Nomura Securities International: "Japanese
top management need not concentrate on short-term-profit schemes for the sole purpose of
appeasing its investors. In the United States, by contrast, each quarter's profit statement
brings around renewed panic ot exaltation, as investors concentrate on short-term results
rather than long-term profit and investment. Japan's separation of management and inves-
tors, however, allows freer investment in long-term physical assets, which, of course, contrib-
utes to Japan's strong economic performance.").
102 Hermann H. Kallfass, The American Corporation and The Institutional Investor:
Are There Lessons From Abroad? The German Experience, 1988 Colum Bus L Rev 775,
782-83.
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adding to their enormous power.103 Like the keiretsu, the German
structure insulates management from short-term pressures. It con-
centrates the control of shareholdings within a group capable of
effective monitoring, but oriented toward the long-term business
health of the corporation.104
3. Applicability of the Japanese and German examples.
Even if we favored the full-scale transplantation of the Japa-
nese or German models into the Anglo-American corporate envi-
ronment, which we do not, we recognize that present antitrust and
banking statutes would forbid it and that the American and Brit-
ish political systems would probably reject the concentration of
corporate power in such small groups.105 But some of the concepts
of the Japanese and German structures can be applied to the
American and British systems. Professors Gilson and Kraakman
describe the Japanese and German structures as the "banker
model." They dismiss the banker model as "inapposite to the cir-
cumstances of the American institutional investor," claiming that
it "unifies, rather than bridges, ownership and control."'1 6
103 Id at 783 ("It is hardly possible for private investors to effectively control the exer-
cise of voting rights by banks, and in practice they do not do so. This enables banks to
pursue their own interests when exercising voting rights, for instance, voting with a view to
their lending or investment business."); Dirk Schnalenbach, Federal Republic of Germany,
in Lufkin and Gallagher, eds, International Corporate Governance at 109, 111 (cited in note
98) ("As a general rule the banks tend to exercise their power in support of management
which... will often make shareholder activism and attempts by shareholders to maximise
shareholder value in a way which is contrary to the present policy of management, seem
futile.... In their role as lenders the banks prefer a long-term increase in the substance of
the company rather than the distribution of high yield dividends.").
104 See, for example, Kallfass, 1988 Colum Bus L Rev at 790-91 (cited in note 102)
("Bank representatives are thus involved in filling positions on managing boards and in
making important business decisions. The resulting stability of control reduces the pres-
sures on managers, freeing them to pursue medium to long-term corporate objectives.");
Porter. The Competitive Advantage of Nations at 376 (cited in note 75) ("Sustained com-
mitment to the business is reinforced by the nature of German capital markets. Many com-
pany shares are held by banks and other long-term holders, who often play a prominent role
on boards. . . .The concern for quarterly earnings, in preference to actions required to
sustain the long-term position, has been all but absent, in contrast to the United States.");
Andrew Fisher, Banks Facing Up to Foreign Competition, The Banker 22, 39 (Apr 1987)
("The country's two biggest banks, Deutsche and Dresdner, played important roles in the
nursing back to health of Germany's largest shipping group, Hapag-Lloyd.... At AEG, the
electrical and electronics giant now controlled by Daimler-Benz, banks were also instrumen-
tal in preventing a collapse into bankruptcy.").
105 See Gilson and Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director at 28 & n 52 (cited in
note 1) (noting political and cultural barriers to use of Japanese and German structures in
the United States and United Kingdom).
106 Id at 27.
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The German banks and the Japanese keiretsu, however, con-
stitute monitors, not managers, of the public corporation. Owner-
ship and management remain separate, but the structure of stock
ownership ensures the alignment of the interests of the managers
and stockholders around the long-term interests of the business
enterprise, and creates a stockholder presence capable of shielding
management from short-term pressures and monitoring managerial
performance. There is no reason that the systems of the United
States and United Kingdom cannot be reconstructed, by far less
radical means, to serve the. same goals: alignment of stockholder
and corporate interests around the long-term health of the corpo-
ration as a business enterprise, insulation of management from
short-term financial pressures, and effective monitoring of the
long-term business performance of the corporation's managers.
C. Leveraged Buyouts
In the United States and the United Kingdom, the replace-
ment of public with private ownership structures, particularly
through leveraged buyouts (LBOs), has become a common means
of reuniting ownership and management, and has been cited as a
means of improving corporate efficiency.10 7 Substantial equity
stakes for managers, active monitoring by the LBO sponsor/inves-
tor, and freedom from the preoccupation with reported quarterly
earnings and takeover defenses often combine to cause substantial
improvement in the newly private corporation's business opera-
tions.10 8 The financial incentives and risks for the management of
the post-LBO corporation can motivate quite effectively: the man-
ager who takes personal loans, perhaps even mortgages his house,
to participate in the equity of a buyout has a more direct financial
stake in the corporation's success than the manager who is insu-
lated from personal financial risk.
107 Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, Harv Bus Rev 61, 65 (Sept-
Oct 1989) ("[T]hese organizations' resolution of the owner-manager conflict explains how
they can motivate the same people, managing the same resources, to perform so much more
effectively under private ownership than in the publicly held corporate form."); Frank H.
Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 Yale L J 698, 706
(1982) (when firms go private they eliminate or substantially reduce the separation of own-
ership and control).
108 See, for example, Brett Duval Fromson, Life After Debt: How LBOs Do It, Fortune
91 (Mar 13, 1989) (describing how O.M. Scott & Sons, Borg-Warner, and other companies
substantially improved their operating performances in response to the pressures and op-
portunities created by LBOs).
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The current recession demonstrates, however, that LBOs also
entail enormous risks for corporations and the economy as a whole.
Overleveraging engendered by the LBO wave has left many corpo-
rations in 'dire straits as the economic growth of the 1980s has
slowed or reversed. 10 9 Even those newly private corporations that
are not facing bankruptcy often find that massive debt and inter-
est payments siphon off the cash they need to invest in productive
uses. The debt burden of the LBO arguably forces managers to
operate efficiently in order to meet their payments. 110 But LBO
debt imposes a decidedly short-term discipline. Lenders in an
LBO, unlike the lender/stockholders of the German and Japanese
systems, are attracted by the initial transaction fees and seek a
quick repayment of their loans."' The LBO thus replaces the
short-termism of the institutional stockholder and the hostile take-
over with the short-termism caused by the need to pay down debt
quickly.
Even proponents of the LBO as a promoter of efficiency recog-
nize that "the LBO capital structure is simply inappropriate ...
for large numbers of public corporations that require the cash flow
flexibility to fund [research and development] or to compete in
growing markets.""' 2 Moreover, the corporation taken private in
an LBO typically goes public again within a matter of a few
years." 3 Indeed, taking the LBO company public is the only way
the LBO investor can realize the 30-40 percent annual equity re-
turns promised by LBO sponsors. Returns at that level depend on
high leverage and quick resale of the equity. Thus, the LBO does
not offer a widely applicable, long-term answer to the problems of
corporate governance.
D. Patient Capital
A more promising model for the United States and the United
Kingdom is the "patient capital" philosophy exemplified by War-
ren Buffett and Berkshire Hathaway, of which Mr. Buffett is chair-
man. Like the LBO sponsor and management investor, Mr. Buffett
109 See sources cited in note 77.
110 Jensen, Harv Bus Rev at 66-67 (cited in note 107).
"I See Staff of House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee
on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong, 1st Sess, Leveraged Buyouts and the Pot of Gold:
1989 Update 148 (Committee Print, 1989) (testimony of L.W. Seidman, FDIC Chairman)
(substantial origination fees and selling fees are significant inducements to banks' competi-
tion to lend for LBOs).
"' Gilson and Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director at 25-26 (cited in note 1).
113 See Louis Lowenstein, Management Buyouts, 85 Colum L Rev 730, 731 (1985); Les-
lie Wayne, 'Reverse LBO's' Bring Riches, NY Times DI (Apr 23, 1987).
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serves the role of a knowledgeable and motivated monitor for the
companies in which he and his company invest. But he invests in
unleveraged companies and has a time horizon far beyond that of
the typical LBO investor. He treats "almost all [Berkshire
Hathaway's] investments as long-term ownership commit-
ments. '"114 Mr. Buffett says: "[W]e have no interest at all in selling
any good businesses that Berkshire owns, and are very reluctant to
sell sub-par businesses as long as we expect them to generate at
least some cash and as long as we feel good about their managers
and labor relations." ' 1 5
This investment strategy has produced astonishing results.
Berkshire Hathaway's return has far exceeded that of the market
and almost any investment manager: "Since Mr. Buffett took over
Berkshire, $10,000 invested in its shares has grown to be worth
about $1.5 m[illion], a compound growth rate of 23% a year."116
The patient capital approach teaches that long-term investment in
successful business enterprises can provide a highly attractive re-
turn, over a much longer period, when contrasted with a preoccu-
pation with short-term results and takeover premiums. As The
Economist concludes, "Whenever a typical money manager claims
that at least his betting-slip ways produce results, remind him gen-
tly of Warren Buffett.""' 7
IV. THE QUINQUENNIAL PROPOSAL
In this Part we describe our proposal for reform of the Ameri-
can and British corporate governance systems. This proposal, the
quinquennial system, seeks to make stockholders and managers
think and act like long-term owners by combining the patient capi-
tal approach of Warren Buffett, the long-term monitoring ap-
proach of the Japanese and German ownership structures, and the
financial incentives for managers of the LBO. The quinquennial
system would permit the delegation of control of the corporation to
its managers for sufficiently long periods of time to allow them to
make the decisions necessary for the long-term health of their cor-
poration. At the same time, it would force managers to develop
and justify their long-term plans for the corporation, and would
evaluate and compensate managers based on their ability to imple-
Capitalism at 15 (cited in note 10).
"' Id (quoting statements of Warren Buffett in Berkshire Hathaway Annual Report to
Stockholders).
11 Id.
117 Id at 16.
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ment those plans successfully. The system would motivate stock-
holders, directors and managers to work cooperatively towards the
long-term business success of the corporation. And, if it ultimately
became necessary, it would allow stockholders to remove incompe-
tent or venal management and to force the sale or restructuring of
the corporation if that is determined, after sufficient time and
study, to be the best alternative.
The first section of this Part sketches the broad outlines of the
quinquennial system. Succeeding sections provide a detailed
description of each element of the proposal: the operation of stock-
holder meetings, the use of the proxy machinery, public reporting
requirements, managerial compensation, rules governing takeovers,
and the role of outside directors. The final section discusses the
steps necessary to implement the system. We have presented the
basic concept of the quinquennial system before. " 8 Here we pre-
sent it in fully developed form, as a response to the concerns out-
lined in the preceding Parts.
A. The Quinquennial Concept
The essence of the quinquennial proposal is to convert every
fifth annual meeting of stockholders into a meaningful referendum
on essential questions of corporate strategy and control, and to
limit severely the ability of stockholders to effect changes in con-
trol between quinquennial meetings. Stockholders would elect di-
rectors for five-year terms. Directors seeking reelection would
stand on the corporation's record for the past five years and its
strategic plan for the next five years. Stockholders would base
their determination of whether to oppose incumbent directors, and
focus any challenge they determined to mount, on the same issues.
Between these quinquennial election meetings, stockholders could
remove directors only for personal illegal conduct or willful malfea-
sance, or if the corporation were guilty of such conduct. The board
would have to consent to any takeover between quinquennial
meetings. Potential acquirors could, however, make unsolicited ac-
quisition proposals in conjunction with the quinquennial meeting,
in which case the meeting would become a referendum on the pro-
posals. In connection with the quinquennial meeting, any stock-
holder or group of stockholders owning five percent or more of the
18 Martin Lipton, An End to Hostile Takeovers and Short-Termism, Financial Times
§ 1 at 21 (June 27, 1990); Martin Lipton, Quinquennial Election of Directors: A Proposal
for Discussion, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz Memorandum to Clients (Apr 9, 1990) (on
file with U Chi L Rev).
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corporation's outstanding shares, or shares having a market value
of five million dollars or more, would have the same access as the
incumbent board to the corporate proxy machinery, in support of
any candidates they wished to nominate. This access would include
corporate payment of proxy contest expenses to the same extent as
incumbent expenditures.
In the year of the quinquennial meeting, within 75 days after
the corporation's fiscal year ends, the corporation would send to its
stockholders a detailed report on its performance over the prior
five years compared to its strategic plan, together with industry
averages and other relevant data. The report would also detail the
corporation's projections for the next five years, the assumptions
underlying those projections, expected returns on stockholder in-
vestment, and the management compensation plan. At the same
time, an investment bank, accounting firm, or other outside advi-
sor selected by the board would send stockholders a detailed, inde-
pendent evaluation of both the corporation's performance for the
prior five years and its projections for the next five years. Stock-
holders would have 60 days after the mailing of the report and
evaluation to decide whether they wish to nominate candidates for
election as directors.
Because the quinquennial proposal would eliminate coercive
takeovers, it would also eliminate the panoply of private takeover
defenses and state legislation. It would make moot the issue of
whether and the extent to which directors can consider non-stock-
holder constituencies: decisions on takeover bids would lie in the
hands of the stockholders at the quinquennial meetings, and would
be at the discretion of the board between meetings. It would also
affirm the "one-share, one-vote" provisions currently embodied in
Rule 19c-4 under the Securities Exchange Act.119 In sum, it would
make the quinquennial election a true, unobstructed stockholders'
referendum on the corporation's performance and plans.
The quinquennial system would strengthen the board's inde-
pendence by requiring a majority of outside directors. The system
would look to outside directors to provide an effective monitoring
function over the operations of the corporation. The increased
119 17 CFR § 240.19c-4 (1990) (Rule 19c-4 seeks to deter corporate action, including
issuance of new class of securities, which "[has] the effect of nullifying, restricting, or dispa-
rately reducing the per share voting rights" of existing common stock shareholders.). But
see The Business Roundtable v SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (DC Cir 1990) (Rule 19c-4 invalidated
because SEC exceeded its authority under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in adopting
the Rule.).
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ability of stockholders to replace directors at the quinquennial
meeting would lead directors (and, at the directors' insistence,
managers) to work far more closely with major stockholders than
they typically now do. To avoid the risk of replacement at the
quinquennial meeting, directors would carefully monitor the corpo-
ration's progress against its long-term plan and maintain a close
dialogue with stockholders with respect to the corporation's ongo-
ing performance. Meanwhile, the five-year period between elec-
tions, and the extremely limited ability to replace directors other-
wise, would leave stockholders with little choice but to work
cooperatively with directors during the five-year period, within a
structure that focuses all parties on the long-term business per-
formance of the corporation.
Lack of information for outside directors, as well as lack of
time or expertise to evaluate corporate information, often limits
directors' ability to monitor managerial performance. 120 The five-
year report would lower the information barrier for directors as
well as stockholders, and encourage managers and outside advisors
to consult more often with outside directors on the corporation's
performance and direction. Many corporations today present their
directors with an in-depth annual review by management and
outside advisors of the corporation's business plan and objectives,
its historical success or failure in meeting these objectives, and the
steps it plans to take in the future. The quinquennial system
would encourage this type of healthy in-depth analysis.
The quinquennial system would make the corporation's five-
year performance, including its success in meeting its five-year
plan, the sole basis for incentive compensation. It would eliminate
the annual or biannual incentive awards now common. Managers
would receive substantial rewards, well in excess of current com-
pensation levels, only if the corporation met or exceeded its goals.
Given the increased demands on their time and resources, outside
directors would receive more compensation than they now gener-
ally do, with an incentive system similar in concept to
management's.
The quinquennial system would benefit the corporation's
other constituencies, which prosper if the enterprise's business op-
120 See, for example, Lorsch, Pawns or Potentates at 55-58 (cited in note 19); Gilson
and Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director at 22 (cited in note 1). See also William
L. Cary and Melvin A. Eisenberg, Cases and Materials on Corporations 215-16 (Founda-
tion, 5th ed 1980).
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erations prosper over the long term.121 Moreover, by eliminating
hostile takeovers and removing the pressure for excessive leverag-
ing, the quinquennial system would ameliorate the societal disloca-
tions that resulted from the takeover and leveraged buyout wave of
the last decade. 122
At the outset, we suggest limiting the quinquennial system to
large corporations, such as the Standard and Poor's 500 or the
Business Week 1000, which are more heavily held by institutional
investors. After experience with these corporations, the quinquen-
nial system could then apply to a broader group.
The quinquennial proposal would not entrench directors or
managers. It is not designed to prevent changes in corporate con-
trol, but rather to channel nonconsensual changes in control into a
more healthy forum. The primary defect of the takeover activity of
the past decade is not that it allowed for the replacement of direc-
tors and managers, but that it forced an external, short-term focus
on companies, directors, managers, and their stockholders. The
quinquennial system, by making the corporate proxy machinery
available to substantial stockholders who wish to nominate a com-
peting slate of directors, would actually enhance the ability of
stockholders to replace incumbent directors and to change corpo-
rate strategy. But it would provide this opportunity within a
framework that permits the corporation to carry out long-term
plans, and permits stockholders to assess their results before de-
ciding whether they are satisfied with their directors' performance.
Removal and replacement of directors would occur by means of an
orderly stockholder vote, based on full information. The quinquen-
nial framework would thus prevent the hurried decisionmaking im-
posed on corporations and their stockholders in the context of hos-
tile takeover battles123 and would eliminate the type of abusive,
coercive takeover activity prevalent in recent years.
The remainder of this Part dvelops in more detail the ele-
ments of the quinquennial proposal and the rationale underlying
each element.
121 See Part II.D.
122 See Parts II.B. and I.C.
122 See 17 CFR § 240.14e-1(a) (1990) (tender offer may be completed in as little as
twenty business days). This is hardly a time frame within which to decide intelligently the
destiny of the enterprise.
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B. The Quinquennial Meeting
1. Rationale for five-year terms.
The five-year period between election meetings affords direc-
tors and managers some measure of freedom from the short-term
focus now imposed on them by institutional stockholders' pressure
for quarterly results and the ever-present takeover threat. Like the
four-year terms of American presidents and the six-year terms of
senators-as opposed to the two-year terms served by members of
the House of Representatives-it encourages a focus on long-term
policy decisions. 1 4 Yet the period is short enough that directors
and managers would feel an ongoing need to report to stockholders
on their plans and progress. The period is also short enough to
permit development of a realistic business plan for presentation to
stockholders in connection with the election meeting; five years is a
common yardstick for business planning today. Annual meetings of
stockholders would continue for matters other than election of
directors.
The five-year time period would also give institutional stock-
holders enough time to evaluate managers and directors and to
plan an effort to replace ineffective directors. Free access to the
corporate proxy machinery and to detailed business information,
in connection with the quinquennial meeting, would enable institu-
tional stockholders to monitor effectively and knowledgeably. The
election of a competing slate of directors would become a realistic
and practical alternative for dissatisfied stockholders, giving direc-
tors and managers a powerful incentive to work cooperatively with
stockholders throughout the period between quinquennial
elections.
2. Limited exceptions to the five-year rule.
The five-year period would not be wholly inflexible. As noted
above, the quinquennial proposal contemplates that directors
would be removable by stockholders during the five-year interim in
extreme cases of individual or corporate misconduct or illegality. It
would also be possible to provide an "escape valve" for the unusual
case where the corporation is doing so poorly that five years might
be too long a period to wait for directors to come up for reelection.
124 See Gary C. Jacobson, The Politics of Congressional Elections 87-91, 216-18 (Little,
Brown, 2d ed 1987); M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler, eds, The Electoral Process
28-29, 37-38 (Prentice-Hall, 1966) (noting flaws in political system produced by fact that
incumbent Representatives usually conduct perpetual campaigns).
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For example, the holders of 20 percent of the corporation's shares
could be allowed to call an election meeting during the five-year
interim if the corporation failed to achieve at least 80 percent of its
five-year projections for two consecutive years. Any such meeting
would be subject to the same requirements as the quinquennial
meeting: major stockholders would have access to the corporate
proxy machinery, and the corporation would issue a detailed report
together with the advisors' evaluation of that report.
But any exceptions to the five-year rule must operate only in
truly exceptional circumstances, or the system would not promote
the long-term perspective that is its goal. For example, there
should be no exception to the five-year rule for an acquisition pro-
posal from a third party. The incumbent board would consider any
proposal made between elections and accept or reject it as the
board determines appropriate. The board's determination with re-
spect to the acquisition proposal might become an issue at the next
quinquennial meeting, but not before.
C. Access to Corporate Proxy Machinery
1. The need to ensure meaningful elections.
The most commonly cited obstacles to effective corporate de-
mocracy are the ability of management to control the corporate
proxy machinery and the cost to any one stockholder or group of
stockholders of amassing the information necessary to evaluate the
performance of managers and directors properly.12 5 The efforts of a
single investor or a group of stockholders to evaluate the corpora-
tion's business or run a proxy contest may benefit all stockholders,
but there is no effective means to eliminate free riders and dis-
tribute the costs among all stockholders. 26 Corporate elections
therefore tend to produce a realistic challenge to incumbent direc-
tors only in the context of takeover battles, fueling the contention
of proponents of the managerial discipline model that hostile take-
overs are needed to discipline managers and directors. 27
12 See, for example, Eisenberg, 89 Colum L Rev at 1474-75 (cited in note 46); Jeffrey
N. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder
Choice, 76 Cal L Rev 3, 43-44 (1988).
12 See, for example, Eisenberg, 89 Colum L Rev at 1478-79 (cited in note 46); Jeffrey
N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 Colum L Rev 1549, 1575-76
(1989).
127 See Edward Jay Epstein, Who Owns the Corporation? 13 (Priority, 1986) (Corporate
elections are "procedurally much more akin to the elections held by the Communist party of
North Korea" than real democratic elections because "they normally provide only one slate
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Corporate elections need not be a sham, however. The quin-
quennial meeting structure removes the chilling effect of an ever-
present takeover threat on long-term planning. Once election con-
tests are no longer simply another short-term coercive takeover
tactic, they can become a meaningful referendum on the corpora-
tion's business plans and performance. The combination of free ac-
cess to the corporate proxy machinery, and the provision of the
detailed information contemplated by the five-year report, dis-
cussed in greater detail below, would effect this restructuring. It
would also eliminate the free rider problem, by allocating the costs
of the information gathering and the proxy process to the corpora-
tion and thus, effectively, to all stockholders.
The quinquennial proposal would grant free access to the cor-
porate proxy machinery in connection with the quinquennial meet-
ing to any stockholder or group of stockholders with at least five
percent of the outstanding shares, or shares having an aggregate
market value of five million dollars or more. These thresholds are
high enough to exclude "gadfly" stockholders, but low enough not
to impede the serious, substantial stockholder who wishes to pro-
pose nominees or a slate of directors in an election contest. Access
to the corporate proxy machinery would include the corporation's
payment of the challenger's proxy expenses, up to the amount that
the incumbent directors spend on the proxy contest. This would
place institutional stockholders on the same footing as the corpora-
tion's board with respect to nomination and election of corporate
directors, thereby radically improving the ability of these stock-
holders to participate meaningfully in the selection of directors.
The quinquennial proposal does not, however, anticipate the
frequent, wholesale replacement of directors every five years. The
very credibility of the quinquennial election would lead directors
and managers to develop a working relationship with the corpora-
tion's major stockholders. And once the stockholders are placed in
a structure that promotes a focus on the long-term business opera-
tions of the corporation, they will be more inclined, except in ex-
treme cases, to try to influence the incumbent directors and man-
agers rather than risk the disruption to business operations of a
wholesale change in senior personnel.
The quinquennial proposal would also eliminate SEC Rule
14a-8, which generally allows any holder of $1,000 worth of a cor-
poration's stock to require inclusion of a proposal in the corpora-
of candidates."). See also Easterbrook and Fischel, 94 Harv L Rev at 1170-74 (cited in note
1).
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tion's proxy statement.12 While intended to promote stockholder
interest in corporate governance, in practice this rule has become
the tool of gadflies who seek to promote special interests. 129 Stock-
holders may espouse any cause they wish, but the corporate proxy
machinery is rarely the appropriate forum for such expression.
More recently, institutional investors have also used Rule 14a-
8 to address voting procedures and takeover-related issues and de-
fenses. The last few years have seen a spate of proposed stock-
holder resolutions dealing with rights plans, confidential voting,
and golden parachutes.'30 The quinquennial proposal would largely
supersede this agenda by eliminating takeover defenses and limit-
ing nonconsensual changes of control to the quinquennial meeting,
at which major stockholders or groups of stockholders would have
full and free access to the corporate proxy machinery. Moreover,
the availability of the quinquennial meeting as a realistic means
for institutional stockholders to replace directors would increase
responsiveness to institutional concerns during the interim periods.
Rule 14a-8, accordingly, would become unnecessary.
2. Proxy access only desirable as part of fundamental reform.
Access to the corporate proxy machinery as contemplated by
the quinquennial system is desirable only in conjunction with the
other elements of the proposal. Granting substantial stockholders
free access (including coverage of reasonable expenses) to the cor-
porate proxy machinery, without reorienting those stockholders
away from a strictly short-term perspective, would only exacerbate
the short-term pressures and detrimental effects of the takeover
activity of recent years. If stockholders continue to view their in-
vestment as a gambling chip and any takeover premium as a jack-
pot, then the stockholders' increased ability to nominate and elect
their own directors would only worsen the problems of short-
termism.
17 CFR § 240.14a-8 (1990).
129 See, for example, Jesse H. Choper, John C. Coffee, Jr., and C. Robert Morris, Jr.,
Cases and Materials on Corporations 647 (Little, Brown, 3d ed 1989) (rule recently used to
address issues relating to discrimination, nuclear power, pollution, and divestment from
South Africa).
130 John J. Gavin, Changes in Corporate Control and Governance Communicated
through Proxy Power, in Institutional Investors: Passive Fiduciaries to Activist Owners 91,
95-96 (PLI, 1990) (215 governance proposals submitted by institutional investors and voted
upon at annual meetings in 1989); Dennis J. Block and Jonathan M. Hoff, Emerging Role of
The Institutional Investor, NY L J 5 (Apr 12, 1990) (listing confidential voting, repeal of
poison pills, and golden parachutes as top three subjects of governance proposals).
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Professors Gilson and Kraakman, for example, propose the de-
velopment of a class of professional directors elected by and re-
sponsible to institutional stockholders, suggesting that these direc-
tors could be recruited and monitored by a clearinghouse initiated
by one of the existing "shareholders' rights" groups such as the
Council of Institutional Investors or United Shareholders' Associa-
tion.'3 ' These organizations, however, have been particularly vocal
in their short-term orientation and pro-takeover bias. 32 Gilson and
Kraakman's proposal ignores the pressing need for directors to
adopt a long-term measure of performance or success. Unless the
orientation of institutional stockholders shifts away from the short
term, then directors beholden to these stockholders will simply re-
present a potent constituency seeking a fast return. If selling or
busting up the corporation generates this return, so much the bet-
ter. Only when these stockholders redefine the success of their in-
vestment in terms of long-term operating returns, rather than
takeover or other short-term premiums, will increasing their power
to influence directors and managers promote the long-term health
of the corporation.
D. The Five-Year Report
Institutional stockholders typically lack the resources to inves-
tigate and evaluate the performance of each company in their port-
folios, limiting their ability to participate effectively in corporate
governance. 3 3 The five-year report contemplated by the quin-
quennial proposal would reduce the need for investigation by pro-
viding detailed information on the corporation's performance and
business plans. The critique of the five-year report by independent
advisors would fulfill the evaluation function, minimizing the need
for stockholders to expend their own resources in order to judge
the validity of the corporation's own report.
13! Gilson and Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director at 39-42 & n 71 (cited in
note 1). For example, Professor Gilson was co-chairman of the USX Corporation share-
holder committee, formed by corporate raider Carl C. Icahn "to press for the rapid sale or
spinoff of the USX Corporation's steel business." Gregory A. Robb, Icahn Group to Urge
USX Sale of Steel Unit, NY Times D5 (Nov 15, 1990).
132 See text at notes 78-80.
133 See, for example, Jensen, Harv Bus Rev at 66 (cited in note 107) (too costly for
institutional investors to become involved in major decisions and long-term strategies of the
companies in which they invest); John Plender, The Limits to Institutional Power, Finan-
cial Times § 1 at 20 (May 22, 1990) (institutional stockholders in the United Kingdom lack
industry-specific expertise and information needed to play a role in corporate strategy).
1991]
The University of Chicago Law Review
1. The corporation's report.
The quinquennial proposal contemplates that the corporation
would continue to issue annual reports as currently required for
public corporations. In the quinquennial year, however, the corpo-
ration would issue a far more thorough document, resembling the
"blue book" evaluation of the corporation typically prepared by a
corporation's investment banker or management consultant. First,
it would review the corporation's performance for the prior five
years against the five-year plan set forth in its prior five-yeai re-
port, and against the performance of other companies in the corpo-
ration's industry, the market in general, and any other relevant in-
dices. A narrative description would evaluate the performance,
explain trends, and review the reasons for the corporation's operat-
ing successes and failures.
The report would also detail the corporation's five-year busi-
ness plan, including projections, the assumptions underlying them,
the factors likely to affect whether the projections are met, and the
corporation's ability to control or influence these factors. These
projections should not raise liability concerns in light of the federal
safe-harbor rules that protect companies against claims of securi-
ties fraud in connection with projections made in good faith.""
The SEC might also promulgate special safe-harbor provisions for
the five-year report.
The report would discuss the return on investment if the cor-
poration's projections were met, and the dividend stream antici-
pated by the corporation. If the corporation plans to retain earn-
ings instead of paying them out as dividends, the report would
discuss the anticipated uses of these funds. The report would also
contain a narrative description of the corporation's five-year stra-
tegic plan, the steps the corporation intends to take to accomplish
its goals, and the anticipated short-term and long-term implica-
tions of the plan for the corporation's financial results.
Some may be concerned that the five-year plan would set goals
that could prove too easy to meet in the event of an economic up-
swing that begins after the plan is drafted.'35 Each five-year re-
port, however, would compare historical performance not only
against the corporation's plan, but also against the performance of
other companies in the industry, the market in general, and other
relevant measures. These requirements, together with the advisor's
131 17 CFR § 230.175 (1990); 17 CFR § 240.3b-6 (1990).
115 Sykes, Corporate Takeovers at 43-44 (cited in note 85).
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independent report and the likelihood of a continuing dialogue
among directors, managers, and stockholders throughout the five-
year period, would ensure that managers and directors made every
effort to exceed their targets if general economic and other condi-
tions permit.
2. The independent advisor's evaluation.
The separate advisor's report would address the concern that
institutional investors might not be able to judge an acceptable
five-year plan."3 6 The advisor selected by the board to report to
the stockholders could be an investment banking firm, consulting
firm, or similar entity that provides other services to the corpora-
tion, or a firm engaged solely for the purpose of rendering the eval-
uation. The advisor's appointment by a board with a majority of
outside directors, its direct relationship and responsibility to stock-
holders, and the importance of its reputation for integrity would
work to assure the independence and quality of the advisor's re-
port. If additional assurance of independence is desired, the advi-
sor could be appointed by a committee, such as the audit commit-
tee, consisting entirely of outside directors. Moreover, institutional
stockholders would quickly determine which advisors' evaluation
reports were worthwhile and would lead corporations to select
these advisors. Given these practical safeguards, there is no need to
disqualify advisors who have prior working relationships with the
corporation. These firms may be the most familiar with the corpo-
ration and its operations, and therefore the most logical and capa-
ble candidates to perform the evaluation.
While the advisor would be free to include such information in
the evaluation as the advisor believed necessary, at a minimum the
evaluation would: (1) review the previous five years' performance
by the corporation, assessing the successes and failures of the cor-
poration and the comparative performance of other corporations,
both in the industry and in general; (2) comment on management's
explanation of the corporation's performance; (3) review the pro-
jections in the corporation's report, as well as the assumptions un-
derlying the projections and the factors likely to affect the corpora-
tion's ability to meet the projections; (4) assess the corporation's
ability to meet the projections; (5) evaluate the corporation's stra-
tegic plan for the next five years; and (6) comment on the stock-
136 Id at 44.
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holder investment objectives likely to be met by successful imple-
mentation of the plan.
The advisor would have the benefit of the same safe harbor as
the corporation, and would be permitted a customary indemnifica-
tion from the corporation, which would exclude acts of negligence.
As in the case of independent accountants evaluating a firm's fi-
nancial reports, possible liability for negligence, 137 and, more im-
portantly, the concern for reputation, would motivate care by the
advisor.
3. Benefits of the report and evaluation.
The report and evaluation would encourage stockholders to
view their shares as a stake in the operating performance of the
corporation rather than as a mere financial instrument. Along with
the long-term orientation imposed by the quinquennial election of
,directors, the .report and evaluation would give institutional stock-
holders the means to understand the strategic direction and corpo-
rate objectives of their portfolio companies, and to intervene or sell
their shares if they differ with these plans.3 8
The discipline of the five-year report would also improve the
quality of annual reporting. Stockholders would demand annual
reports that analyze where the corporation stands within the five-
year framework, the causes and consequences of any discrepancies
between performance and projections, and what changes, if any,
are necessary for the business plan. Managers and directors inter-
ested'in retaining their positions at the quinquennial meeting
M See, for example, Schneider v Lazard Freres & Co., 159 AD2d 291, 552 NYS2d 571
(1990) (investment bankers who advised a Special Committee of the board of directors in a
sale-of-control context could be liable in negligence to the company's stockholders). For crit-
icism of the court's holding, see Herbert M. Wachtell, Eric M. Roth, and Andrew C. Hous-
ton, Investment Banker Liability to Shareholders in the Sale-of-Control Context, NY L J 1
(Mar 29, 1990); John C. Coffee, Jr., New York's New Doctrine of 'Constructive Privity', NY
L J 5 (Jan 25, 1990). See also Rachel Davies, Bidders Can Sue in Takeover Case, Financial
Times 33 (Oct 30, 1990) (reporting on 1990 English Court of Appeal decision holding that
the financial advisors and auditors of a company may be liable to an unwanted takeover
bidder for allegedly negligently prepared financial statements and forecasts issued before
and during the pendency of the bid, on which the bidder could foreseeably rely in deciding
whether to make or increase its offer).
"SS For excellent suggestions on how to reform corporate reporting, see generally Peter
N. McMonnies, ed, Making Corporate Reports Valuable (Kogan Page, 1988) (urging reports
that encourage a long-term perspective). The study, prepared by the Institute of Chartered
Accountants of Scotland, notes the need for an increased level of independent assessment of
corporate reports. The study suggests, as is contemplated by the quinquennial proposal,
that the assessor's role be expanded far beyond the role of the typical outside accountant in
the current corporate reporting scheme. Id at 84.
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would naturally provide this sort of useful information in the in-
terim years.
The expanded information contained in the five-year report
and evaluation, and the improved quality of annual reporting,
would enable analysts to better assess the performance and pros-
pects of each corporation, and would increase investor confidence
in the expected performance of an investment. Perceived invest-
ment risk to stockholders should decline in turn, resulting in a
lower risk premium and a lower cost of capital to the corporation.
The additional information would also assist stockholders in more
closely matching their investment objectives to the objectives of
the corporations in which they invest, thereby further reducing the
risk premium and the cost of equity capital. Ultimately, the quin-
quennial proposal would bring institutional investor knowledge in
the United States and the United Kingdom closer to the level now
seen in Japan and Germany. This could bring the return on equity
demanded by investors in our markets, and the cost of capital,
more in line with that of the Japanese and German markets.139
Some corporations may argue that the requirements of the
five-year report are too onerous, or that wide distribution of pro-
jections or the advisor's evaluation would damage the corporation.
Well-managed corporations, however, should welcome the five-year
reports and the quinquennial proposal as a whole. Most well-man-
aged corporations today develop, at least internally, detailed stra-
tegic plans and five-year projections. Any corporation seeking fi-
nancing must go through such a process; a well-managed
corporation and its management should want to develop a detailed
long-term strategic plan and measure its performance against this
plan.
Nor can the argument that publication of projections and stra-
tegic plans would harm the corporation withstand analysis. On the
basis of information already available to them, most good analysts
can develop projections for the corporations they follow. These
projections do not produce the same investor confidence as man-
agement's own projections, but they typically come very close to
what the corporation itself would prepare. The quinquennial pro-
posal does not require disclosure of trade secrets or competitively
139 See, for example, Short-termism, part 20, The Economist 76 (June 30, 1990) (cost of
capital is higher in United States and United Kingdom than in Japan and Germany); Gary
Hector, Why U.S. Banks Are In Retreat, Fortune 95 (May 7, 1990) (from 1983 to 1988 the
cost of capital for United States companies was twice that of competitors in Japan and West
Germany).
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vital business information. Sophisticated investors understand, and
the five-year report would emphasize, that projections constitute a
framework, not a crystal ball. Even with such a qualification, how-
ever, the framework set forth in the projections and the strategic
plan would be of great value in assessing the performance and di-
rection of the corporation.
The real objection of some corporations is likely to be their
reluctance to establish a concrete framework against which to
judge management's performance or to have management publicly
critiqued by an outside advisor. Yet an effective system of corpo-
rate governance depends on the ability to evaluate the business
-performance and direction of the corporation and its management.
The corporation least willing to expose itself to such an evaluation
probably needs it most.
E. Management Compensation
1. Compensation linked to performance.
The revision of compensation structures would reinforce the
long-term time horizon contemplated by the quinquennial system
by directly aligning the managers' personal financial interests with
the long-term success of the corporation. Financial incentives and
risks for managers in leveraged buyouts contribute significantly to
the performance of those buyouts that succeed. 40 And the dissatis-
faction of many managers who want a more significant share of any
increase in value generated by the business success of the corpora-
tion fuels strong management interest in participating in these
buyouts. 4'
Today, managerial compensation is not adequately related to
the long-term results of the corporation's business operations. Ob-
servers note the "dearth of financial incentives for top manage-
ment to make the costly and risky decisions that can promise sub-
stantial long-term payoffs for the shareholders."' 42 They also
complain that high levels of managerial compensation persist in
140 George Anders, Leaner and Meaner Leveraged Buy-Outs Make Some Companies
Tougher Competitors, Wall St J -Al (Sept 15, 1988) (financial risks at stake in LBO force
management to be more aggressive). See also Jensen, Harv Bus Rev at 69 (cited in note
107).
141 Capitalism at 12 (cited in note 10); Sykes, Corporate Takeovers at 11-12 (cited in
note 85).
142 Graef S. Crystal, Cracking the Tax Whip on C.E.O.'s, NY Times Mag 48 (Supple-
ment on the Business World, Sept 23, 1990); see also Sykes, Corporate Takeovers at 11-12
(cited in note 85); Jensen and Murphy, Harv Bus Rev at 39 (cited in note 21).
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corporations whose performance is poor, effectively rewarding
managers for corporate failure. 143 To the extent a large portion of
an executive's compensation is set regardless of the corporation's
success, the executive lacks any financial motive to improve the
business performance of the corporation. Incentive compensation
plans tied to the corporation's annual performance, or performance
over even shorter time periods, reinforce the problems of short-
termism.14
The quinquennial proposal would link significant financial
risks and rewards for managers to corporate performance against
the corporation's five-year goals. Managers would receive no bo-
nuses or stock awards based on any. shorter time period.1 45 The
specific compensation plan for each corporation would be part of
the quinquennial plan submitted to stockholders. It could also be
subject to evaluation by a compensation consultant, in a manner
similar to the advisor's evaluation of the five-year business plan.
2. An illustrative plan for compensation.
One possible plan would allocate ten percent of the corpora-
tion's shares to management, contingent on at least a twelve-per-
cent increase in the market price of the corporation's shares, com-
pounded over the five-year period (a net increase of 76 percent).
The actual increase in market price in any given year would be
irrelevant; the plan would look only to the five-year average. Man-
agers would receive half the ten-percent stake if the price increase
met the twelve-percent target, and an additional one percent of the
corporation's shares for each additional one percent per year mar-
ket price increase above twelve percent, up to the maximum ten
percent if the compound growth rate for the five years reached or
exceeded 17 percent. The shares would then vest in equal install-
ments over the next five years, thus limiting the possibility of man-
"" Crystal, NY Times Mag at 48, 54 (cited in note 142); Jensen and Murphy, Harv Bus
Rev at 39 (cited in note 21); White, Financial Times at 11 (cited in note 43).
... Dertouzos, Lester, and Solow, Made in America at 62 (cited in note 46) ("A chief
executive whose compensation is a strong function of his company's financial performance
in the current year is naturally going to stress short-term results. Indeed, some executive-
compensation schemes may encourage managers to adopt an even shorter time horizon than
the capital markets do.").
I'l A number of writers have similarly suggested the need to enhance the financial re-
wards to managers of corporations achieving successful long-term business results while cre-
ating a meaningful financial penalty if the corporation's long-term business performance is
poor. See sources cited in note 142. See also Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations
at 529 (cited in note 75).
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agement "loading" the first five-year period at the expense of the
future. If the corporation did not meet the targeted compound in-
crease in stock price, but otherwise achieved its five-year goals,
managers could receive a specified cash bonus. If the corporation
fell short of its five-year goals, managers would receive no incentive
compensation and no increase in base salary. This compensation
plan would encourage successful managers to stay with the corpo-
ration, much as the incentive arrangements with managers of
leveraged buyout corporations require them to stay on for a mini-
mum period of time. While the time frame for realizing the finan-
cial reward would be relatively long, the size of the potential re-
ward would be sufficiently great to lead managers to accept the
plan.146
The quinquennial proposal would also prohibit employment
arrangements that inhibit the ability to replace managers in con-
junction with the quinquennial meeting, or that create personal in-
centives in conflict with the focus on the successful long-term busi-
ness operations of the corporation. Thus, for example, the
corporation could not enter into employment contracts with its
managers that extend beyond the quinquennial term. Nor could it
offer golden parachutes. 141 However, broad-based severance poli-
cies that provide for severance payments regardless of whether
there has been a change of control would be permitted.
Management compensation and employment arrangements
would thus complement the quinquennial system's reorientation of
the corporation's constituencies around the corporation's long-term
business success. This system would remove the structural impedi-
ments to the ability of managers to manage for the long term,
while the financial reward structure would create positive incen-
tives to adopt a long-term personal time horizon.
F. The Prohibition on Takeovers and Elimination of Takeover
Defenses
The quinquennial election would be the sole means of accom-
plishing nonconsensual changes of control. Between meetings, di-
"0 See CEO Roundtable on Corporate Structure and Management Incentives, 3 Conti-
nental Bank J Applied Corp Fin 6, 20 (Apr 1990) (Richard Sim, chief executive officer of a
company that grants stock options that cannot be exercised for five years, commented, "Un-
less they're in it for the long haul, they will get discouraged and quit; and that's, quite
frankly, just the way I want it.").
"'7 "Golden parachute" as used here refers to severance contracts providing for large
payments to executives who are fired or leave under other specified circumstances following
a change of control or sale of the corporation.
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rectors would not be removable except for criminal conduct or will-
ful misfeasance. In addition, no stockholder could acquire more
than ten percent of a corporation's stock without the board's con-
sent. The would-be acquiror therefore could not purchase a con-
trolling stake in a corporation and then coerce a "consensual"
change of control, making the next quinquennial election a fait
accompli.
Correspondingly, the quinquennial system would prohibit
takeover defense devices and repeal takeover-related state legisla-
tion. It would thus eliminate share purchase rights plans, 4 ' stag-
gered boards, 4 ' supermajority "fair price" provisions, 50 standstill
provisions,' 5' control share acquisition statutes, 52  and business
combination moratorium statutes. 53 It would reinstate the sub-
stance of SEC Rule 19c-4, limiting the ability of public corpora-
tions to issue equity with disproportionate voting rights. 54
I'l Such plans deter control acquisitions not approved by the corporation's board of
directors by making inexpensive new shares available to current shareholders other than the
acquiror, diluting the acquiror's stake and increasing the leverage of the board in responding
to an unsolicited acquisition attempt. Share purchase rights plans were first developed by
one of the authors as a response to abusive takeover tactics. In the context of the quinquen-
nial system's restrictions on changes in control, the protections afforded by rights plans
would be unnecessary.
149 In these arrangements, one-third of the board typically comes up for reelection each
year. Under Delaware law, members of a staggered board may only be removed for cause,
unless the charter provides otherwise. 8 Del Code Ann §§ 141(d), (k) (1990).
150 These provisions, found in many corporate charters and some state statutes, impose
a supermajority voting requirement on mergers, sales of assets, liquidations, and recapitali-
zations between the corporation and an "interested person" (typically defined as a 10-20
percent stockholder) unless the transaction meets specified price requirements. See, for ex-
ample, Ill Ann Stat ch 32, § 7.85 (Smith-Hurd 1990).
5I Under these provisions a stockholder agrees to vote with management at election
meetings, or agrees not to contest management's proposals or nominees, in exchange for
some corporate concession or as a condition to the corporation's sale of newly issued securi-
ties to the stockholder.
152 Control share acquisition statutes provide that shares acquired in a "control share
acquisition," defined as the direct or indirect acquisition of shares constituting voting power
in the target corporation of at least 20 percent, 333 percent, or 50 percent, automatically
lose their voting rights unless a majority of the disinterested holders of each class of stock
approves. See, for example, Ind Code Ann §§ 23-1-42-1 to 21-1-42-11 (West 1989); CTS
Corp. v Dynamics Corp. of America,. 481 US 69 (1987) (upholding constitutionality of Indi-
ana statute).
1 New York's statute prohibits certain in-state corporations from entering into a busi-
ness combination, including certain self-dealing transactions as well as mergers and consoli-
dations, with a 20 percent stockholder for five years after the 20 percent threshold is
crossed, unless the board grants approval in advance of the 20 percent acquisition. NY Bus
Corp Law § 912 (Law Co-op Supp 1989). See also Amanda Acquisition Corp. v Universal
Foods Corp., 877 F2d 496 (7th Cir 1989) (Easterbrook) (upholding constitutionality of simi-
lar Wisconsin statute).
'" See note 119.
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The quinquennial proposal would also repeal all constituency
statutes. Because hostile takeovers could only occur as a result of
stockholder balloting at the quinquennial meeting and, absent bad
faith, self-dealing, or fraud, the board's decision to accept or reject
a takeover proposal in the interim would not be subject to review,
the board would not have to face the issue of whether it: could le-
gally consider the interests of non-stockholder constituencies in re-
sponding to a takeover attempt. Board, management, and stock-
holders would focus not on the threat of takeovers, but rather on
the long-term business success of the corporation, an orientation
that itself protects the interests of non-stockholder
constituencies.'55
The elimination of hostile takeovers and takeover defenses
would channel all nonconsensual changes of control into the quin-
quennial meeting. This would allow stockholders to focus more
clearly on the rationale for any proposed change of control, its
likely consequences and its desirability. Stockholders could make a
considered decision free of coercion from the acquiror or interfer-
ence from the incumbent board or management, making it less
likely that institutional investors would replace good managers
simply to get a takeover premium. The quinquennial meeting
would become an effective referendum on the business and invest-
ment sense of the proposed change of control. To the extent more
than one bidder emerged at the quinquennial meeting, the corpo-
ration could establish auction procedures, and the courts could de-
velop rules on permissible postponements of the meeting in re-
sponse to material developments.'
The elimination of takeover battles between quinquennial
meetings would also dramatically reduce the amount of manage-
ment time and and other corporate resources now spent on
preventing takeovers and developing takeover-related protections.
The quinquennial system would insulate directors and managers
for- substantial enough periods to permit them to develop their fu-
ture plans, while at the same time creating a periodic forum in
which the directors would be totally uninsulated and subject to re-
call by the stockholders. While it is possible that the quinquennial
meeting could become a focal point for hostile takeover activity,
the closer relationship between managers and institutional stock-
See Part II.D.
1 See MA Basic Four, Inc. v Prime Computer Inc., CA No 10868 (Del Chanc, June
13, 1989) (permitting board to postpone contested election meeting in light of material
changes in challengers' takeover bid shortly before scheduled date of meeting).
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holders that the quinquennial system fosters would reduce the
likelihood of frequent takeover battles. At worst, the quinquennial
system would still free the corporation for substantial periods from
preoccupation with the threat of a takeover.
The quinquennial proposal would not permit incumbent direc-
tors or management to spend corporate funds in litigation or simi-
lar challenges to an opposing slate of directors. The SEC through
the federal proxy rules, not incumbent management through pri-
vate litigation, would police false or misleading statements in the
opposing sides' proxy materials. The SEC has policed proxy fights
quite diligently.157 Whatever additional enforcement benefit pri-
vate litigation might add, the principle of neutrality toward quin-
quennial changes in control that underlies the quinquennial system
could not permit one side of the proxy contest to use corporate
funds to litigate against the other in a litigation initiated by the
incumbents. Incumbents could, however, use corporate funds to
defend litigation initiated by the opposition.
Eliminating the takeover battleground should remove much of
the current friction between managers and institutional stockhold-
ers, which is often centered around takeover battles and antitake-
over defenses. Institutional stockholders have mounted anti-poison
pill stockholder resolution campaigns. Incumbent boards have
adopted a panoply of takeover defenses. Legislatures have enacted
antitakeover legislation. Stockholders complain that directors are
simply trying to entrench themselves. Managers complain that
stockholders only care about takeover premiums. The whole de-
bate engenders a degree of distrust and hostility that undermines
the necessary spirit of patience and partnership essential for long-
term operating success in today's business world.
Under the quinquennial system, institutional stockholders
would have to take at least a five-year perspective, or dispose of
their investment. Incumbent directors would have to justify the
five-year performance and plans of the corporation or risk being
voted out of office at the quinquennial meeting. The frequency of
the incumbent directors' vulnerability would diminish, but the vul-
nerability, when it arises, would be heightened due to the existence
of easily measured goals and the elimination of takeover defenses.
The net result would be that the focus of directors, managers and
See David A. Sirignano, Review of Proxy Contests by the Staff of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, in Proxy Contests, Institutional Investor Initiatives, and Manage-
ment Responses 261, 263 (PLI, 1990) (SEC staff acts to "assure that the security holders
receive the information they are entitled to under the proxy rules and are not misled.").
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stockholders would merge on the corporation's long-term business
success.
Mergers, acquisitions, and other business combinations would
remain possible during the interim between quinquennial meet-
ings. The incumbent board would retain its duty to examine and
evaluate any bona fide acquisition or merger proposal in the con-
text of the corporation's strategic plan. If the directors were to ap-
prove an acquisition involving the issuance of securities with more
than 25 percent of the corporation's voting power, they would sub-
mit the transaction to the corporation's stockholders. 15 If the di-
rectors were to reject a merger or acquisition, however, the stock-
holders' only recourse would be to replace them at the next
quinquennial meeting. Because of the unfettered ability of stock-
holders to approve a change in control at the quinquennial meet-
ing, directors would not be liable for rejecting an acquisition pro-
posal in the interim, except in cases of bad faith, fraud or self-
dealing.
The quinquennial system would remove a significant barrier to
negotiated transactions, particularly stock-for-stock transactions
that make strategic sense and that avoid the dangerous levels of
debt that takeover activity has engendered. Directors are currently
reluctant to pursue equity mergers for fear they will put the com-
pany "in play" and result in the corporation being forced to accept
an undesirable business combination. 159 By barring nonconsensual
takeovers except at the quinquennial meeting, the new system
should eliminate such fears. Moreover, the focus on strategic direc-
tion that the quinquennial system promotes will likely encourage
corporations to give careful consideration to the role strategic ac-
quisitions, mergers, or combinations might play in the develop-
"' For examples of similar trigger mechanisms, see ALI, Principles of Corporate Gov-
ernance § 1.32 at 46-47, 101 (cited in note 27); New York Stock Exchange, Listed Company
Manual § 312.03(c) (July 1989); American Stock Exchange, Company Guide § 712 (May
1990); NASDAQ, Notice to Issuers (Oct 16, 1990) (announcing amendment to Schedule D,
Part I, Section 5(i) of the By-Laws of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.,
calling for stockholder approval of any issuance of stock in connection with a merger' or
acquisition equal to 20 percent or more of outstanding voting shares).
1 See Paramount Communications, Inc. v Time Inc., 571 A2d 1140 (Del 1989). Al-
though the court held that the preplanned equity merger between Time and Warner could
proceed, Time was forced to defend itself at great expense against the hostile advances of
Paramount. See generally Laura Landro, David B. Hilder, and Randall Smith, Time Inc.'s
Stock Soars $44 a Share as Wall Street Bets Paramount's Offer Will Derail Merger With
Warner, Wall St J A3, 12 (June 8, 1989) (Paramount's chief executive officer "told analysts
that Time 'put itself up for sale' by handing over 60% ownership to Warner shareholders in
the proposed Time-Warner merger."). The authors' law firm represented Warner in this
transaction.
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ment of the corporation's business. The quinquennial system
might have a slight chilling effect on riskier acquisitions that, if
unsuccessful, would threaten the corporation's ability to meet its
five-year goals. On the whole, this chill is as likely to be a positive
as a negative consequence.
G. The Role of Outside Directors
1. Incentives for effective monitoring.
The quinquennial proposal would require that a majority of
each public corporation's board be composed of directors otherwise
unaffiliated with the corporation. Thus, the quinquennial system,
like the current system of corporate governance, looks to the
outside director as the primary monitor of the business perfor-
mance of corporate managers. But the quinquennial proposal
would make the outside director more vulnerable to replacement
by stockholders. Incumbent directors now rarely lose their seats in
a proxy fight, except in the context of a tender offer or acquisition
proposal. Critics therefore charge that outside directors are not re-
sponsive to stockholders because they owe their jobs to manage-
ment.6 0 With the greatly enhanced ability of stockholders to chal-
lenge incumbent directors at the quinquennial meeting, directors
who are unresponsive to stockholders would likely lose their seats.
Outside directors would have an increased incentive to perform an
effective monitoring role.
These directors' ability to monitor would also increase. Some
have pointed to the lack of business information given to outside
directors, and the lack of time and expertise to evaluate this infor-
mation, as major obstacles to the performance of outside directors
as effective business monitors. 161 The five-year report and evalua-
tion contemplated by the quinquennial proposal, the expanded an-
nual reporting and internal reviews it is likely to engender, and the
continuity of a five-year term, would help to remove these barriers.
The framework established by the five-year report should also give
further impetus to the growing practice of regular, detailed inter-
nal and outside advisor reviews, with the entire board, of the cor-
poration's performance, projections, and strategic plan. Directors
140 See Gilson and Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director at 21 (cited in note 1).
See also Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?,
95 Harv L Rev 597, 610 & n 39 (1982) (independent directors are rarely appointed without
prior approval of management).
1I Lorsch, Pawns or Potentates at 84-88 (cited in note 19). See also Coffee, 84 Colum L
Rev at 1202-03 (cited in note 46).
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would insist on the sort of interim reporting and analysis that will
help them push the corporation toward its five-year goals, and jus-
tify any deviation.
Experience in the last few years shows that directors are very
responsive to a proxy fight or even the threat of a proxy fight. Sev-
eral recent proxy fights/consent solicitations have led to conces-
sions by, or the ultimate sale of, the target corporation. For exam-
ple, BTR plc's combined proxy contest and tender offer for Norton
Company resulted in the sale of Norton to a third-party bidder;
Georgia-Pacific Corporation's proxy contest and tender offer for
Great Northern Nekoosa Corporation resulted in the sale of Great
Northern to Georgia-Pacific; Gemini Partners' proxy contest and
consent solicitation to take over the board of directors of Healthco
International, Inc. resulted in the appointment of three Gemini
nominees to the Healthco board and the pending sale of Healthco
to a third party; and the threat by Chartwell Associates to com-
mence a proxy fight with Avon Products to nominate four new di-
rectors who would seek to sell the company resulted in Avon giving
the dissidents two seats on the board and a stronger voice in run-
ning the company.'62 The quinquennial meeting, and the knowl-
edge that institutional stockholders would have access to the cor-
porate proxy machinery to challenge directors with whom they are
dissatisfied, would strengthen the unity, and thus the power, of the
outside directors in taking an active role in monitoring the corpo-
ration's business performance. In this manner, the remaining barri-
ers to effective monitoring by outside directors would be lowered.
Given the outside directors' heightened monitoring role, the
quinquennial proposal would limit the number of boards on which
an outside director could serve to three, and would increase their
compensation. In addition to an increase in base compensation, the
outside director-like managers-would participate substantially
in stock-based incentive compensation tied to the corporation's
five-year performance. Such provisions would further motivate the
corporation's outside directors to fulfill their role as monitors of
the corporation's long-term direction and business performance,
162 Randall Smith, Storming the Barricades With a Proxy, Wall St J C1 (May 10,
1990); Healthco to Give Gemini Partners L.P. 3 Seats on New Board, Wall St J C8 (Sept
21, 1990). See also Phillip A. Gelston, New Developments in Proxy Contests, in Tenth An-
nual Institute: Proxy Statements, Annual Meetings and Disclosure Documents 651 (Pren-
tice-Hall, 1988) (citing examples of proxy contests to promote a policy of selling or restruc-
turing the company). The authors' law firm represented Norton in its proxy contest with
BTR, and Healthco in its proxy contest with Gemini.
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and would meet the complaint of some institutional investors as to
the minimal share ownership of most outside directors.
2. The perils of special-interest directors.
Professors Gilson and Kraakman argue that traditional
outside directors cannot be effective monitors of managerial per-
formance because, through the nomination process and through so-
cial ties, they are tied too closely to the management they monitor,
and because they are too independent of stockholders. 1' 3 The first
part of this argument reflects a view that managers and directors
must have an adversarial relationship in order for the monitoring
function to be successful. In fact, the opposite is true. The direc-
tor-manager relationship must be a cooperative one, not an adver-
sarial one, in order to be effective. While the adversarial director or
board may have the ultimate threat of firing to enforce their poli-
cies, the likelihood of full and successful responsiveness by manag-
ers to the views of directors is much greater when the manager is
motivated by respect and friendship than when motivated by
fear.1 6
4
The second part of the argument reflects the view that an
outside director cannot be responsive to a corporate constituency
without being nominated by, or specially designated to represent,
that constituency. The quinquennial proposal responds to this con-
cern by aligning the interests of the various corporate constituen-
cies-stockholders, managers, employees, and the corporation it-
self-around the corporation's long-term business success.
It is not necessary, and indeed it would be divisive, to elect
separate classes or groups of directors to represent the various cor-
porate constituencies, or to have any constituency have a separate
special right to nominate or advise on the nomination of direc-
tors.16 5 A board monitors best when it works as a cohesive whole,
each director viewing himself as representing all constituencies. 6
Once the corporation's various constituencies all center on the
long-term health of the enterprise as their common goal, then
traditional outside directors would have ample incentives to work
cooperatively with inside directors, management, stockholders, and
11 See Gilson and Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director at 21 (cited in note 1).
... See note 45 and accompanying text.
"' Compare Gilson and Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director (cited in note 1)
(recommending election of professional outside directors by, and beholden to, institutional
stockholders).
"' Lorsch, Pawns or Potentates at 41-54 (cited in note 19) (the more directors explic-
itly agree about in whose interests they are governing, the more they will feel empowered as
a group).
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the other constituencies to improve the corporation's operating
performance. For similar reasons, it is not necessary that the chair-
man of the board be someone other than the chief executive
officer. 16 7
H. Implementation
The best way to implement the quinquennial system would be
through a comprehensive legislative package, adopted in the
United States by Congress and the state legislatures and abroad by
Parliament in the United Kingdom, or by a Directive of the Euro-
pean Economic Community to all its member states, including the
United Kingdom. 68 This comprehensive approach would require
the corporate world and the institutional investor world in each
country to work together toward adoption of the new system. In
this Section, we discuss the roles that various groups in the United
States could play to make the quinquennial proposal a reality. We
then briefly discuss the implementation of the quinquennial propo-
sal in the United Kingdom.
1. Congress.
The best hope for coordinated nationwide implementation lies
with federal legislation. This legislation could take one of three
forms: a) a substantive federal corporation law that would essen-
tially replace existing state law; b) legislation that mandates the
quinquennial concept but leaves specific implementation to the
states; or c) legislation that complements, but does not mandate,
implementation at the state level.
We favor the second approach. While a federal law of corpora-
tions is within the power of Congress,6 9 such radical change is un-
necessary. There is no need to transfer the responsibility for, and
the burden of, corporation law as a whole to the federal govern-
ment and judiciary. On the other hand, non-mandatory legislation
would encourage but not ensure uniform adoption of the quin-
17 But see id at 184-85 & n 5 (proposing separation of the offices of chairman of the
board and chief executive officer).
168 EEC legislation may take several forms, including Regulations and Directives. Regu-
lations are immediately binding and directly applicable to all member states. Directives
bind member states to achieve certain specific results. The results can be achieved in many
ways, usually by enacting the appropriate legislation in that member state.
10 See, for example, Donald E. Schwartz, A Case for Federal Chartering of Corpora-
tions, 31 Bus Law 1125, 1146 (1976) (substantial federal interest in operation of large corpo-
rations would overcome any Tenth Amendment objection to federal chartering of
corporations).
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quennial proposal. While adoption on a state-by-state basis would
have some beneficial effect, the quinquennial system would work
best as a national solution.
Federal legislation mandating the quinquennial system, but
leaving implementation to the states, would ensure nationwide
adoption of the quinquennial system, while preserving state con-
trol and administration of corporation laws. This legislation would
require that within a specified period of time (perhaps two years),
each state amend its corporation law to provide for the quinquen-
nial election of directors; the prohibition of nonconsensual changes
in control between election meetings; the abolition of takeover de-
fenses and repeal of state antitakeover legislation; access to the
corporate proxy machinery for major stockholders; publication of
the quinquennial report and evaluation; and guidelines for permis-
sible corporate compensation schemes. We also suggest interim leg-
islation providing for a temporary moratorium on takeovers be-
tween the introduction and adoption of quinquennial legislation.
This moratorium addresses the concern that the pendency of the
quinquennial legislation might prompt a destructive surge in hos-
tile takeover activity. 170
Federal legislation would implement directly, or delegate to
the SEC, necessary revisions to federal proxy and general disclo-
sure laws and rules, the reinstatement of SEC Rule 19c-4, and the
repeal of SEC Rule 14a-8. States would maintain whatever other
provisions of corporation law they desired, as long as those provi-
sions did not threaten to undercut the quinquennial system. States
would also remain responsible for administering their own corpora-
tion laws, and state courts would continue to interpret and enforce
those laws.
Historically, it has been difficult to achieve the necessary con-
sensus for federal legislation affecting takeovers. 17 1 As a first step
toward overcoming this difficulty, Congress could create an advi-
sory panel including representatives of both the corporate and the
institutional investor worlds. Congress could require the panel to
report back shortly with a fully developed legislative proposal sup-
ported by both groups. Alternatively, the Treasury Department's
task force on corporate governance could undertake to achieve the
necessary consensus.
170 See Sykes, Corporate Takeovers at 44 (cited in note 85).
171 See, for example, Thomas G. Donlan, Twice Shy: Congress Unlikely to Try Another
Anti-Buyout Bill, Barron's 15 (May 1989).
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2. States.
If federal legislation initially proves impossible, the next-best
alternative would be implementation by individual states. While
federal law historically has governed disclosure requirements and
proxy procedures, the quinquennial system's proposals in these ar-
eas do not conflict with existing federal law and thus could be en-
acted by the state. The prohibition on nonconsensual changes in
control between election meetings is the only element of the quin-
quennial system that would raise serious constitutional questions if
enacted without federal authorization. In light of the obviously le-
gitimate state interest in the quinquennial proposal as a whole,
however, enactment of this provision by states should survive any
constitutional challenge. 1 2 Moreover, even if states could not con-
stitutionally ban nonconsensual changes in control between elec-
tion meetings, they could accomplish much the same purpose by
prohibiting removal of directors between quinquennial meetings or
limiting the voting rights attached to shares acquired in excess of a
specified percentage of outstanding shares without the approval of
the corporation's directors.
State-by-state implementation would begin in states with
small populations of major public corporations. A variety of com-
peting constituencies and political forces, similar to those found on
the national level, tend to operate in Delaware and other states
where large numbers of major corporations are incorporated. If
these forces block development of the consensus necessary to
achieve federal legislation, they would probably also block passage
of legislation in these key states. In a state where a limited number
of major corporations are incorporated, however, those corpora-
tions and their corporate constituencies could combine to secure
enactment of the quinquennial system by the state legislature.
Success of the system in a few such states would facilitate its wider
adoption.
The first step in this process would be for one or a group of
the major corporations in a state to work with the state bar groups
to develop a legislative proposal. The corporations would also so-
licit input and support from any of its major stockholders who de-
sired to participate in the process. Support of a legislative corpo-
172 See CTS Corp. v Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 US 69 (1987) (Indiana's interest
in protecting its corporations and regulating their internal affairs outweighed any extraterri-
torial effects of control share acquisition statute); Amanda Acquisition Corp. v Universal
Foods Corp., 877 F2d 496, 503, 506 (7th Cir 1989) (following CTS in upholding constitution-
ality of Wisconsin's business combination statute).
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rate governance proposal by many of the state's large corporations,
their major stockholders, and the state bar groups would virtually
guarantee passage.
3. The Securities and Exchange Commission.
Development of the federal proxy and disclosure provisions of
the quinquennial system would fall naturally within the domain of
the SEC. Congress could delegate to the SEC the job of developing
detailed rules governing the five-year report and the advisor's eval-
uation, just as the SEC has historically developed disclosure and
reporting rules under existing securities laws. 173 The SEC would
also develop rules governing the access of major stockholders to
the corporate proxy machinery just as it currently develops and
enforces the federal proxy rules."7 4
The SEC could take the lead in implementation of the quin-
quennial proposal by developing and advising on federal or state
legislative proposals for such implementation. The staff of the SEC
has extensive experience with a number of the issues raised by the
quinquennial proposal. Representatives of the SEC could serve on
the congressional advisory panel charged with developing a federal
legislative proposal. Alternatively, the SEC could work with the
Treasury task force, or conduct an independent study of the pro-
posal and offer recommendations for improving it.
4. Corporations and institutional investors.
Corporations and institutional investors would serve primarily
as advocates for adoption of the quinquennial system. Through
public statements, private discussion and legislative lobbying, they
could play a key role in developing political support for the propo-
sal. Those who opposed the proposal could engage in similar ef-
forts, encouraging proponents to either accommodate or rebut sig-
nificant objections.
Business groups such as The Business Roundtable and the
National Association of Manufacturers, institutional stockholder
groups such as the Council of Institutional Investors, and major
public investment funds such as CalPERS, provide preexisting ve-
173 See, for example, 17 CFR §§ 240.13a-1, 240.13a-11 and 240.13a-13 (1990) (requiring
annual, quarterly, and other reports on prescribed forms); 17 CFR § 240.13d-1 (1990) (re-
quiring disclosure of beneficial ownership in excess of five percent of a corporation's shares);
17 CFR § 239.11 to 239.34 (1990) (setting forth forms prescribing disclosure requirements
for registration statements under the Securities Act of 1933).
17, 17 CFR §§ 240.14a-1 to 240.14a-102 (1990).
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hicles for discussion of the quinquennial proposal. The identifica-
tion of these groups with fixed positions in the corporate govern-
ance debate, however, may create obstacles to constructive dia-
logue. Accordingly, we also encourage discussion among individual
corporate leaders and institutional stockholders. The congressional
advisory panel, or any other legislatively appointed panel or com-
mission, would provide an appropriate forum for such discussion.
5. The United Kingdom.
Parliament could enact the, entire quinquennial system
through a comprehensive amendment to the Companies Act, the
principal regulatory statute governing public companies in the
United Kingdom. 175 The extensive relationships among industry,
merchant banks, institutional stockholders, and governmental
agencies such as the Bank of England-for example, in their roles
on the City Panel on Takeovers and Mergers' 7 6-would permit
these groups to work together toward implementation of the new
system. Alternatively, the United Kingdom's role as a member of
the EEC may make it more appropriate to implement the quin-
quennial system through an EEC Directive to member states. This
approach' would be analogous to federal legislation in the United
States mandating enactment of the quinquennial system but leav-
ing implementation to the states.
As in the United States, the key would be to gain the support
of both the corporate world and the institutional investor world.
Recognition of the corporate governance problem is high in the
United Kingdom, and the perceived need for reform is great. The
quinquennial system responds to the concerns voiced in the United
Kingdom by participants in the corporate governance debate; ac-
cordingly, adoption of the system may be possible.
1'7 Companies Act 1985, II Palmer's Company Law T A-051 at 1011 (1985). See also
Companies Act 1989, II Palmer's Company Law I A-110 at 1509 (1989) (incorporating
amendments that reflect, among other things, certain EEC directives).
17' The Takeover Panel is a non-statutory body that regulates takeovers through its
interpretations of the City Code on Takeovers and Merges, an industry code containing
general principles and specific rules relating to takeovers. Members of the Takeover Panel
include representatives of merchant banks, investment fund managers and institutional in-
vestors, professional accountants, the Bank of England, the Securities Association, the Stock
Exchange and the Confederation of British Industry. See generally Tony Shea, Regulation
of Takeovers in the United Kingdom, 16 Brooklyn J Intl L 89 (1990); Lord Alexander of
Weedon, Q.C., Takeovers: The Regulatory, Scene, 1990 J Bus Law 203.
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CONCLUSION
The intensity of the corporate governance debate in the
United States and the United Kingdom reflects a deep-seated con-
cern with the present system. Virtually all participants in the de-
bate recognize that the present system will not meet our needs in
the 1990s and beyond. We cannot afford to repeat the financial
chaos of the 1980s or the crises that inevitably follow such a specu-
lative frenzy. While corporate governance is only one factor in de-
termining the success of our business corporations, it is a key fac-
tor. It is imperative that we rebuild the corporate governance
system to promote the long-term health of the corporations that
form the backbone of our free-market economy.At the theoretical level, this task entails rejection of the mana-
gerial discipline model of corporate governance, which places
stockholder wishes, stockholder profit, and the promotion of take-
overs on an undeserved pedestal. This model encourages the sort
of short-term obsessions that continually undermine the ability of
American and British companies to compete in world markets over
the long term. In place of the managerial discipline model we pro-
pose a theory centered on the corporation's own interest in its
long-term business success. This interest, when multiplied many
times over, in classical economic theory mirrors the interest of all
corporate constituencies and society as a whole.
At the practical level, we urge adoption through the coordi-
nated efforts of many actors-state and federal, public and pri-
vate-of a quinquennial system of corporate governance. This sys-
tem would reserve essential decisions of corporate control and
strategy for stockholders to decide every five years, in a meeting
dedicated to rational and unfettered consideration of the corpora-
tion's long-term interests. Not all aspects of the quinquennial sys-
tem would find favor with corporations or with institutional stock-
holders; it is not designed to meet the wishes of either. But it
would meet the needs of our economies, and lead both corporations
and institutions to act in the national interest.
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